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Even though most American retirees benefit from Medicare coverage, a
mounting body of research predicts that many will face large and increasing out-ofpocket expenditures for healthcare costs in retirement and that many already
struggle to finance these costs. It is unclear, however, whether the general
population understands the likely magnitude of these out-of-pocket expenditures well
enough to plan for them effectively. This study is the first comprehensive
examination of Americans’ expectations regarding their out-of-pocket spending on
healthcare in retirement. We surveyed over 1700 near retirees and retirees to assess
their expectations regarding their own spending and then compared their responses
to experts’ estimates. Our main findings are twofold. First, overall expectations of
out-of-pocket spending are mixed. While a significant proportion of respondents
estimated out-of-pocket costs in retirement at or above expert estimates of what the
typical retiree will spend, a disproportionate number estimated their future spending
substantially below what experts view as likely. Estimates by members of some
demographic subgroups, including women and younger respondents, deviated
relatively further from the experts’ estimates. Second, respondents consistently
misjudged spending uncertainty. In particular, respondents significantly
underestimated how much individual health experience and changes in government
policy can affect individual out-of-pocket spending. We discuss possible policy
responses, including efforts to improve financial planning and ways to reduce
unanticipated financial risk through reform of health insurance regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our current system for retiree healthcare relies on seniors to finance a
significant portion of their own healthcare expenditures in retirement. Even though
most will benefit from Medicare coverage, Medicare pays for only about 60% of
retiree healthcare costs1 and, on its own, has no limit on “out-of-pocket” spending
(premiums and direct payments for cost sharing and uninsured care).2 Supplemental
insurance is available to cover what Medicare does not, but it can be expensive and
still leave some coverage gaps.3 Recent studies estimate that the median Medicare
beneficiary spends about 16% of his or her income on out-of-pocket healthcare
spending,4 and some spend as much as one-third of their annual income on such
costs.5
Retirees’ role in managing healthcare expenditures will only grow as the cost of
medical care increases, employer-sponsored retiree healthcare disappears, and
insurance shifts in form from defined benefit to defined contribution. Experts project
healthcare spending will consume a larger share of retirees’ disposable income,6 as
much as 50% of post-tax income for some retirees by 2030,7 even without major
changes to Medicare or Medicaid in response to federal budget constraints.8
Even under current conditions, prior studies, based on various measures of
financial distress, show that retirees are already struggling in the face of large,
uncertain, and increasing out-of-pocket costs,9 but it is unclear why. One reason
1
PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. B ENEFIT R ESEARCH INST., NO . 351, ISSUE BRIEF: FUNDING
SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR P ERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE 3 (2010), available
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_12-2010_No351_Savings3.pdf.
2
Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, The Insurance Value of Medicare, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED .
1773, 1773 (2012).
3
F RONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (citing variation in Plan F premium amounts across states).
4
JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY F OUND ., MEDICARE C HARTBOOK 72 (4th
ed. 2010) [hereinafter KFF CHARTBOOK ].
5
ELIOT F ISHMAN ET AL ., C OMMONWEALTH F UND , MEDICARE OUT -OF-P OCKET C OSTS: CAN
PRIVATE SAVINGS INCENTIVES S OLVE THE P ROBLEM? viii (2008) (discussing low-income retirees,
retirees in fair or poor health, or those over eighty-five years old.).
6
RICHARD W. J OHNSON & C ORINA MOMMAERTS , URBAN INST ., R ETIREMENT POLICY P ROGRAM,
WILL HEALTHCARE C OSTS B ANKRUPT AGING BOOMERS? 1-2 (2010) (reporting that by 2040 half of
adults over sixty-five will spend 19% of income or more on healthcare, up from 10% in 2010); see
also, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL ., C TR. FOR R ET. R ESEARCH BOS. C OLL., No. 8-3, H EALTHCARE
COSTS DRIVE UP THE NATIONAL R ETIREMENT RISK INDEX 4 (2008); Jonathan Gruber & Helen Levy,
The Evolution of Medical Spending Risk, 23 J. ECON . PERSP. 25, 40 (2009).
7
JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6, at 1-2.
8
Healthcare spending comprises an increasing share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
of federal budget dollars. C ONG . BUDGET OFFICE , HEALTH C ARE AND THE BUDGET: ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES FOR REFORM 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/82xx/doc8255/06-21-healthcarereform.pdf.
9
Studies report savings shortfalls, healthcare costs as exacerbating retirement risk (defined as a
substantial and detrimental decrease in standard of living) or healthcare costs consuming a large
portion of household assets. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL ., CTR. FOR R ET . RESEARCH B OS. COLL .,
NO . 9-7, LONG -TERM C ARE C OSTS AND THE NATIONAL R ETIREMENT RISK INDEX 6 (2009) (including
long-term care and healthcare in calculations of national retirement risk increased estimates of those
at risk from 44% to 61% for the overall population); ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 5;
JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. B ENEFIT RES. INST ., NO . 10, NOTES: R ETIREMENT SAVINGS S HORTFALLS FOR
TODAY ’S WORKERS 2 (2010) (estimating average retirement savings shortfall of over $47,000 per
individual for both basic living expenses and out-of-pocket healthcare costs, not including nursing
home and home healthcare costs which, if added, increase the average shortfall by an additional
$32,000 for the average man and by $46,000 for the average woman); Amy S. Kelley et al., Out-ofPocket Spending in the Last Five Years of Life, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED ., Sept. 5, 2012, at 4. Some
studies link healthcare spending to bankruptcy for seniors in particular. See generally J OHNSON &
MOMMAERTS , supra note 6. Others find the same, looking at the entire population. See David Dranove
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individuals might be unprepared for retiree healthcare spending could be a failure to
understand the magnitude of future healthcare costs.10 Awareness of costs is a
necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of planning for future spending. We know
Americans care deeply about accessing healthcare when they need it, and studies
show that anticipated healthcare expenditures motivate savings by the elderly, even
more than the bequest motive does.11
It is unclear, however, how much people know about their likely expenditures
and to what degree ignorance might impede successful retirement planning for some
individuals. Compared to deciphering credit card terms or mortgage options,
estimating individual retiree healthcare costs is much more complex, as anyone who
has tried to puzzle through the options for supplemental coverage knows well. The
few studies that examine perceptions of some of the components that affect
spending, such as potential future insurance coverage, suggest confusion exists. For
example, one study found more workers expect to receive retiree health benefits
through a current employer than is likely.12 Prior studies suggest that individuals
have only low to moderate levels of understanding about Medicare, the foundation
of most Americans’ retiree healthcare.13 Another study reported workers’ projections
of their total needs for retirement seem not to take healthcare costs into account and,
despite such an omission, nearly half say they are confident that they will have
enough money to pay for medical expenses in retirement.14
Financial literacy research has shown that one driver of inadequate overall
retirement savings is a knowledge gap15 and that people with more complete
information16 and adequate financial literacy to interpret that information17 plan
& Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. W74, W79 (2006)
(reporting medical bills as a contributing factor in 17% of bankruptcies); David U. Himmelstein et al.,
Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED . 741,
743 (2009) (finding that medical bills contribute to a majority of bankruptcies). Jennifer Prah Ruger
suggests that these methods for measuring financial insecurity and health expenditures underestimate
adverse consequences. Jennifer Prah Ruger, An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Financial
Protection in Health, 9 PLOS MED ., no. 8, 2012, at 1, 5.
10
See, e.g., Jonathan Starkey, Financial Literacy: Health Care’s Big Bite, NEWS J., Nov. 8, 2012,
http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20111023/BUSINESS10/110230328/Financial-LiteracyHealth-care-s-big-bite?gcheck=1&nclick_check=1; Paul Sullivan, Planning for Retirement: Don’t
Forget Health Care Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/yourmoney/planning-for-retirement-dont-forget-health-care-costs.html?pagewanted=all.
11
Mariacristina De Nardi et al., Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses, 118 J.
POL. ECON . 39, 72-73 (2010) (“[W]e find that out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and the way in
which they interact with the consumption floor, go a long way toward explaining the elderly’s saving
decisions and should be accounted for when considering old-age policy reforms.”).
12
See P AUL FRONSTIN ET AL ., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO . 317, ISSUE B RIEF: S AVINGS NEEDED
TO FUND H EALTH INSURANCE AND H EALTH C ARE EXPENSES IN R ETIREMENT: F INDINGS FROM A
SIMULATION MODEL 23 (2008).
13
See B ANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY CO., C TR. F OR SECURE R ET., RETIREMENT HEALTHCARE FOR
MIDDLE -INCOME AMERICANS 18-21 (2012) (showing that middle-age Americans and near retirees are
largely unaware of the benefits and coverage available in the Medicare program and what is not
covered, including vision, dental, and most long-term care benefits); Lauren McCormack et al., Health
Insurance Literacy of Older Adults, 43 J. CONSUMER AFF. 223, 240 (2009).
14
See R UTH HELMAN ET AL ., EMP. BENEFIT R ES. INST., NO . 355, ISSUE BRIEF: THE 2011
RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE S URVEY: CONFIDENCE DROPS TO RECORD LOWS, R EFLECTING “THE NEW
NORMAL ” 10 (2011).
15
Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Financial Literacy, Information,
and Financial Education Programs 11-13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13824, 2008) (describing financial literacy studies that show that lack of information impedes
financial planning).
16
E.g., James J. Choi et al., Small Cues Change Savings Choices 2-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17843, 2012) (showing use of education about 401k savings limits leads
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better for retirement. This research has motivated legal reforms to require better
financial education or disclosure,18 as well as support for regulatory approaches that
use default rules or incentives to induce people to save more, despite imperfect
knowledge and financial literacy shortcomings.19
This study is the first to examine what people understand about their likely
future healthcare spending, and, impliedly, to what degree ignorance might impede
retirement planning. We asked over 1700 individuals in the Rand American Life
Panel, who are approaching or already in retirement, to estimate out-of-pocket
healthcare expenditures they are likely to face in retirement and compared their
estimates to experts’ estimates, which we used as benchmarks. We sought to identify
both whether respondents’ estimates deviated from the experts’ benchmarks and, if
so, what aspects of respondents’ estimates deviated more or less from these
benchmarks. Our starting hypothesis was that individual estimates of retiree
healthcare out-of-pocket costs would, in general, fall well beneath expert estimates.
We were wrong, at least in some regards.
Our main findings, reported in Part III, are twofold. First, with respect to
estimating total out-of-pocket expenditures, we saw a bimodal distribution of
responses. On one hand, some answers approximated expert benchmarks. Almost
40% of respondents’ estimates of monthly out-of-pocket expenditures were at or
above the median expert benchmark for annual out-of-pocket spending.20
to increased savings for members of a defined-contribution plan of a large technology company); Gopi
Shah Goda et al., What Will My Account Really Be Worth? An Experiment on Exponential Growth
Bias and Retirement Saving 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17927, 2012)
(“[P]roviding income projections along with general plan information and materials assisting people
through the steps of changing contribution rates resulted in a 29 percent higher probability of a change
in contributions relative to a control group over a six-month period . . . and increased their annual
contributions by $85 more than the control group . . . .”).
17
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in the
United States, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 517, 523 (2011) (“[I]t appears that financial literacy does
drive retirement planning”); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and
Retirement Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 19 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors) (“By every measure, and in every sample we have examined, we
conclude that financial literacy is a key determinant of retirement planning.”).
18
For example, section 1013(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act for Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection calls for the creation of an Office of Financial Protection for Older American with a charge
that includes research into best practices to educate about long-term savings and planning for
retirement and long-term care. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.). Governmental agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services,
have invested in improving financial and health literacy. ELIZABETH F RENTZEL ET AL., AM. INSTS.
FOR R ESEARCH , C ONSUMER E DUCATION INITIATIVES IN FINANCIAL AND H EALTH LITERACY 3 (2010)
(“These challenging times have created an increasing awareness that a lack of financial and health
literacy can serve as a major barrier to the well-being of individual families and communities . . . a
number of agencies have attempted to improve financial and health literacy.”).
19
See, e.g., R ICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. S UNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); John Beshears et al., The
Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 6
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12009, 2006) (describing that default enrollment
in defined-contribution savings plan increases participation in savings plans); see also John Beshears
et al., Public Policy and Savings for Retirement: The “Autosave” Features of the Pension Protection
Reform Act of 2006, in BETTER LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS (John J. Siegfried, ed. 2010) (reviewing
economic evidence underlying auto-enrollment rules); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Liberalism and
Lifestyle: Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research, 1 EUROPEAN J. OF R ISK REG.
17, 20 (2012) (“[B]ehavioural insights can help policy improve individual decisions-making processes
as well as identify limits of the corrective solutions to cognitive failures.”).
20
Most of these responses were near the benchmark estimate ranges, but some were high outliers, as
discussed below.
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Furthermore, respondents estimated certain components that affect costs, including
likely future insurance coverage, premiums, and life expectancy at levels
surprisingly close to what experts predict. These results suggest that a significant
portion of respondents understand approximate future resources needed to sustain
typical healthcare expenses and that lack of understanding, alone, does not explain
financial planning challenges.21 On the other hand, a significant portion of responses
deviated from the expert benchmarks. More than 50% of respondents’ estimates of
monthly out-of-pocket expenditures fell below experts’ projections for the twentyfifth percentile of retiree out-of-pocket spending. Our median response was over a
quarter below the expert median benchmark. Some subgroups’ estimates deviated
relatively further from benchmarks.22 For example, younger cohorts tended to offer
estimates similar to those of older cohorts, raising potential concerns that younger
respondents may not be anticipating the increases in healthcare expenditures that
experts predict for the coming decades.23 Women respondents projected 50% lower
lifetime expenditures ($30,000 median estimate) than their male counterparts
($60,000 median estimates), despite experts’ estimates that the typical woman will
spend 50% more over her retirement on healthcare costs than the typical man.24
These findings suggest the possibility that ignorance may impede successful
planning for some.
Second, we saw broad misperceptions with regard to the uncertainty of future
healthcare spending. Spending uncertainty arises from three main sources:
unpredictable individual health experience, unexpected medical cost growth, or
policy instability. The distribution of medical spending among retirees is highly
skewed and largely unpredictable.25 Someone with extensive medical needs or the
fortune to live a long life may spend two to three times as much as the typical
retiree.26 Further, future out-of-pocket exposure, even for the typical retiree, depends
on the rate of future healthcare inflation, which has outpaced economic growth for a
number of years27 and may continue to do so.28 Finally, the future of policies
regarding Medicare, Medicaid, and private retiree insurance coverage is in flux and
the effects of the 2010 health reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively
21
In this study, we did not explore the important related question of whether individual expectations
correlate to actual savings for those expenses.
22
In analyzing our survey results, we attempted to explore the extent to which respondent estimates
correlated with factors that experts have found to be associated with higher retiree healthcare costs and
found mixed results. Such demographic factors can predict about 20% to 25% of the variance in spending
among members of a population. Joseph P. Newhouse, Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers:
Efficiency in Production Versus Selection, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1236, 1256 (1996). Respondent
estimates of costs corresponded as experts would predict with some factors, including household income
levels (which experts associate with higher expenditures, as discussed below), some financial literacy
proxies, and anticipated insurance coverage. In contrast, women in our survey estimated lower lifetime
spending than men, contrary to what experts report.
23
Interpretation of this result is ambiguous, as discussed below.
24
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9 fig.2.
25
Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited,
20 HEALTH AFF. 9, 9 (2001).
26
See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
27
CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1, 27 (2010) (reporting that from
1975-2008, excess cost growth in Medicare was 2.5%, in Medicaid was 2.0%, in all other forms of
health insurance was 1.8%, and overall was 1.9%).
28
This inflation is often called “excess cost growth,” defined as the increase in healthcare
spending per person over the growth of GDP per person, adjusted for demographic changes in the
population that might affect healthcare spending. See id. at 10.
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referred to herein as “PPACA”)29 on out-of-pocket spending are uncertain. In
contrast to the mixed findings above, our respondents consistently did not seem to
understand spending uncertainty and the potential impact it could have on their
individual spending. They failed to differentiate between the three aforementioned
sources of uncertainty, which pose very different levels of risk. Furthermore, they
underestimated the potential effect of individual health experience, which can result
in an individual having double to triple expenditures of the typical retiree;30 only a
fifth of all respondents estimated that adverse health experience could lead to a more
than 50% increase in out-of-pocket costs. To oversimplify, some people know costs;
few know risk.
While our findings do not point to any one particular solution, they help to
sharpen the problem definition, prioritize future research, and identify what solutions
might be most promising. As discussed in Part IV, our findings elucidate two
different problems. The first is that, while our current healthcare policies rely on
individuals to finance significant out-of-pocket spending, only some individuals
anticipate this future spending. Because ignorance may impede successful financial
planning, we discuss potential interventions to help individuals plan better and avoid
being unprepared for unanticipated spending in retirement. The second problem we
found, namely a pervasive and significant misapprehension of spending uncertainty,
is equally a problem of insurance regulation and a problem of inadequate
knowledge. We discuss why this shortcoming may be best addressed by regulatory
and policy reforms aimed to ensure that retiree health insurance provide financial
security in the face of spending uncertainty, even when retirees fail to grasp the
magnitude of this uncertainty themselves.
II. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT RETIREE OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTHCARE
EXPENDITURES
A. BACKGROUND ON OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES
Retiree out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures include any amount the retiree
pays directly for healthcare.31 These expenditures include two categories of costs:
(1) premium costs for insurance coverage (Medicare and supplemental insurance
policies) and (2) expenditures for services or items paid for directly by the insured,
which includes cost-sharing (deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance required by
Medicare or a supplemental policy) and expenses for care that is not covered by
insurance (e.g., dental care under many policies).32
Retirees must determine how to piece together Medicare coverage and
supplemental coverage to best meet their needs, which requires navigating a
complex landscape of coverage options and tradeoffs. Medicare finances over half of
total healthcare costs33 for about 39 million eligible individuals age sixty-five and
29
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30
See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
31
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 70 fig.7.2.
32
See id. at 71 fig.7.3 (Bar graph shows breakdown of out-of-pocket expenditures between
premiums and services in 2006).
33
See also id. at 70 (reporting that Medicare finances 48% of total costs of healthcare for
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, who will have a lower portion of their costs financed than
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries).
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older.34 Original, or “fee-for-service,” Medicare is composed of two parts: Part A for
hospital and inpatient care, as well as some home healthcare, and Part B
Supplementary Medical Insurance primarily for outpatient care. For most,
enrollment in Part A is automatic and free.35 Beneficiaries pay a monthly premium to
enroll in Part B, which began at $115.40 in 2011 for the standard premiums and
increased on a sliding scale based on income.36 Low-income enrollees (under 133%
of the federal poverty level (FPL)) with limited assets are eligible for the Medicare
Savings Program (MSP), which defrays all or part of their Medicare premiums and
cost-sharing obligations, and assistance with prescription drug costs through the
Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) program.37 While an estimated 3.6 million are eligible
for MSPs,38 less than one-third of those eligible enroll, which we return to in Part IV
below.
Medicare leaves enrollees vulnerable to potentially high out-of-pocket spending
for using medical care and has no out-of-pocket spending limits.39 For example, in
2013, Part A includes a deductible of $1184 per hospitalization.40 For hospital stays
longer than 60 days, beneficiaries have cost sharing of $296 per day for days 61 to
90, $592 per day for days 91 to 150, and no coverage after 150 days.41 For outpatient
care, beneficiaries pay a $147 deductible and 20% coinsurance for most services.42
Ninety percent of all retirees obtain supplemental insurance coverage, from one
of four main sources, to help fill in these gaps.43 For those without supplemental
34
Dahlia K. Remler & Sherry A. Glied, What Other Programs Can Teach Us: Increasing
Participation in Health Insurance Programs, 93 AM. J. P UB. HEALTH 67, 68 (2003) (reporting that
99% of eligible persons take up Medicare Part A and 95.5% Medicare Part B).
35
KFF C HARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 22. Part A is premium-free if an individual or spouse
worked forty or more quarters of Medicare-covered employment where they contributed Medicare
payroll taxes. Medicare Part A, EXTENDHEALTH.COM , https://www.extendhealth.com/medicare/part-a
(last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
36
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 22.
37
GRETCHEN J ACOBSON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER F AMILY FOUND ., THE ROLE OF MEDICARE FOR
PEOPLE DUALLY ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 9-10 (2011) (describing how Medicaid
defrays premiums or cost sharing for Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs), who must earn under
100% of the FPL to receive assistance with Medicare premiums and cost-sharing; Specified LowIncome Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMBs), who have incomes between 100% and 120% of the FPL and
are eligible for assistance with Medicare Part B premiums; and Qualified Individuals (QIs), who earn
between 120% to 135% of the FPL and receive assistance with premiums in limited circumstances. To
qualify for any of these programs, a beneficiary must have assets at or below $6880 for an individual
or $10,020 for a couple in 2011). For reference, in 2012, the FPL was just over $11,000 for an
individual and just over $15,000 for a couple. 2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, ASPE,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml (last updated Feb. 9, 2012).
38
Stan Dorn & Boaping Shang, Spurring Enrollment in Medicare Savings Programs Through a
Substitute for the Asset Test Focused on Investment Income, 31 HEALTH AFF. 367, 368-70 (estimating
3.6 million eligible for the three MSP programs and under a third enrolled in each). The authors
explain low enrollment as due in part to the application process, including a “burdensome” asset test
and recommend replacing the asset test with an investment income test. Id. at 368-69.
39
What Are the Medicare Premiums and Coinsurance Rates for 2013?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://answers.hhs.gov/questions/3006. (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
40
Medicare Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE .GOV , http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-glance.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2012).
41
Id.
42
Id. There is also significant cost sharing and limited coverage for skilled nursing. Id.
43
KFF C HARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60. While we use this data on supplemental coverage as a
benchmark, it does not perfectly reflect frequency of forms of supplemental coverage among retirees
for two reasons. First, it includes non-elderly disabled on Medicare. Second, KFF only listed one form
of supplemental coverage for each individual according to the following hierarchy: “1) Medicare
Advantage, 2) Medicaid, 3) Employer, 4) Medigap, 5) Other public/private coverage, 6) No
supplemental coverage. Individuals with more than one source of coverage were assigned to the
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coverage through an employer, choosing a supplemental policy among the many
options is complex and has high stakes because out-of-pocket spending can vary
significantly, based on the supplemental coverage an individual has.44 About onethird of Medicare beneficiaries currently have supplemental employer-sponsored
insurance (ESI) for retirees, usually subsidized by the employer.45 ESI generally
provides comprehensive coverage at a relatively low cost to retirees,46 but it is
becoming less frequently available as employers drop retiree coverage.47 Another
one-quarter of beneficiaries enroll in Medicare Advantage (also known as Medicare
Part C), instead of fee-for-service Medicare (Medicare Parts A and B).48 They elect
approved private insurance policy that combines the benefits of Part A and B,
usually Part D prescription drug coverage, and sometimes dental or vision
coverage.49 In 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) limited
the out-of-pocket spending on Medicare Advantage plans to $6700.50 An additional
category that appears highest in the ordering.” Id. This methodology will underestimate forms of
supplemental coverage lower in the hierarchy, such as “other public/private coverage.” Id. As an
example, 22% of Medicare Advantage enrollees have an additional form of coverage (10% selfpurchased private coverage; 10% employer-sponsored; 1% both self-purchased and employersponsored). HENRY J. KAISER F AMILY FOUND ., EXAMINING SOURCES OF C OVERAGE AMONG
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: S UPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE , AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUG C OVERAGE 17 exhibit 3.9 (2008).
44
Those with Medigap supplemental coverage face the greatest total out-of-pocket exposure
(even more than those with no supplemental coverage, who are spared premium costs and may
consume less care than they would otherwise). Dana P. Goldman & Julie M. Zissimopoulos, High
Out-of-Pocket Care Spending by the Elderly, 22 HEALTH AFF. 194, 198 (2003). In contrast, those with
Medicaid are likely to spend much less out-of-pocket, due to the low premiums and cost-sharing
obligations and possibly also due to consumption constraints. Id. at 198-99; see also KFF
CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 78. Including residential long-term care, Kaiser reports average out-ofpocket spending in 2006 of $5066 for a beneficiary with supplemental Medigap, $4275 with
supplemental ESI, $3979 with no supplemental coverage, $3518 with Medicare Advantage, and $2843
with Medicaid. KFF C HARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 78. Another study, based on 2005 MCBS data
(prior to Medicare Part D) and also including long-term care spending, reports median spending of
$3819 for a beneficiary with supplemental Medigap, $2909 with ESI, $2258 for Medicare Advantage,
$1864 with no supplemental coverage, and $490 with Medicaid. T RICIA NEUMAN ET AL ., HENRY J.
KAISER F AMILY FOUND., REVISITING ‘S KIN IN THE GAME ’ AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: AN
UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASED FINANCIAL BURDEN OF HEALTH C ARE S PENDING FROM 1997
TO 2005 2 (2009). This variability persists with regard to total lifetime spending. F RONSTIN ET AL .,
supra note 1, at 9 (estimating median spending of $65,000 for a man with wraparound Medicare
coverage, $66,000 for ESI coverage that an employer subsidizes, and $109,000 for unsubsidized ESI
coverage).
45
See KFF CHARTBOOK , supra note 4, at 60.
46
See id. at 72 (reporting average premiums of $2000 in 2006).
47
See FRONSTIN ET AL ., supra note 12, at 14. The percentage of private-sector employers
offering coverage to Medicare-eligible retirees decreased from 21.6% in 1987 to 12.7% in 2005. Id. at
12. Some attribute this decline to a 1990 rule by the Financial Accounting Standards Board that
required employers to report retiree health liabilities in annual reports. See id. at 11. Even when
employers offer ESI, it has become more expensive and less widely available among retirees. See id.
at 14; see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY F OUND. & HEWITT, FINDINGS FROM KAISER/HEWITT 2006
SURVEY ON R ETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 19-20 (2006) (listing survey results on ESI changes that
affected under sixty-five and over sixty-five retiree health benefits).
48
See KFF CHARTBOOK , supra note 4, at 60.
49
Medicare Advantage Plans, MEDICARE .GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicarebasics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx (last visited June 3, 2011). Some pay an additional monthly
premium on top of the Part B premium; others plans are “zero premium.” The average premium in
2011 was forty-three dollars, based on the cost of plans with prescription drug coverage. Medicare
Advantage providers often receive government rebates, based on plan cost savings over traditional
Medicare, which they can use to provide additional services or reduce premiums. Id.
50
MARSHA GOLD ET AL ., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 2012 SPOTLIGHT: PLAN AVAILABILITY AND
PREMIUMS 1 (2011).
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17% of beneficiaries buy a supplemental “Medigap” policy from a private insurer.51
Medigap plans are standardized by plan type, organized alphabetically from A to N.
Although these plans often have high premium costs, most offer first-dollar coverage
of many or all of the costs not covered by Medicare.52 Premiums vary by plan type
and by state and can range from under $100 to over $400 per month.53 The most
popular plans (Plans C and F)54 cover nearly all costs that Medicare does not;55 some
Plan F beneficiaries opt for a “high deductible” option where they pay the first
$2000 in expenditures,56 after which the Medigap plan covers all costs. Finally,
about 15% to 16% of Medicare beneficiaries are “dually eligible” for Medicaid if
they are disabled or meet the income and assets thresholds, which differ state by
state, 57 in which case they pay little or no premiums and cost-sharing. While
variable across states, these thresholds are low across the board,58 which means that
Medicaid coverage only protects a subset of the poorest retirees against significant
out-of-pocket exposure.
Ninety percent of Medicare enrollees also have a source of supplemental
prescription drug coverage, mostly under the Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit,59 which took effect in 2006 as established by the Medicare Prescription Dug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.60 In 2012, after $4700 in out-ofpocket spending on prescription drugs, a beneficiary has “catastrophic coverage,” in
which the plan pays 95% of additional costs.61
51
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60. Medigap policies typically do not cover long-term care,
vision, dental, hearing aids, or private nursing care. See id. at 20.
52
See Baicker & Levy, supra note 2, at 1773-74.
53
See Medigap Policy Search, MEDICARE.GOV , http://www.medicare.gov/find-a-plan/questions/
medigap-home.aspx (last visited May 31, 2011). Premiums were calculated based on information
provided by the search feature on May 31, 2011.
54
AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, MEDIGAP: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 3 (2011), available at
www.ahip.org/MedigapWhatYouNeedtoKnow/ (reporting 17% of beneficiaries enrolled in Plan C and 45%
in Plan F in 2009).
55
See KATHRYN LINEHAN, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, NO. 845, RECENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT
MEDIGAP COVERAGE AND MODIFY MEDICARE COST SHARING, NAT’L 5 (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB845_MedigapandCostSharing_02-24-12.pdf.
56
Id.
57
See J ACOBSON ET AL., supra note 37, at 3 (reporting that 21% of Medicare eligibles were dualeligibles for Medicaid, just over three-quarters of whom are “fully” eligible for Medicaid benefits).
58
For example, a majority of states are required by Federal Medicaid participation rules to
provide full Medicaid dual eligibility to those who meet the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Program income and asset limits, which for an individual is income under 75% of the FPL and assets
under $2000. Id. at 8. Some states, known as “209(b) states,” may set lower eligibility levels. Id. Even
if not fully eligible for Medicaid, some Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for Medicaid assistance
with all or some of their Medicare premiums and cost sharing through MSPs, as discussed above. Id.
at 2-3. Most states provide full Medicaid benefits at slightly higher income and asset levels than
required or for non-mandatory populations, including the “medically needy,” nursing home residents,
or others in community-based long-term care under a waiver program. Id. at 8.
59
Id. The average monthly Part D plan premium is just over forty dollars. J ACK HOADLEY ET AL.,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY F OUND., MEDICARE P ART D SPOTLIGHT: P ART D PLAN AVAILABILITY IN
2011
AND
KEY
C HANGES
SINCE
2006
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8107.pdf (estimating 2011 premium weighted by enrollment,
based on 2010 enrollment). In 2010, about 60% had a Medicare Part D plan for prescription drugs,
nearly 20% had coverage through an ESI retiree plan, and 13% had some other coverage. KFF
CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 34 fig.3.1.
60
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
61
JACK HOADLEY ET AL ., HENRY J. KAISER F AMILY FOUND., ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG P LANS IN 2012 AND KEY TRENDS S INCE 2006 exhibit 1 (2012) (depicting cost
sharing in Part D plans including $4700 “True Out-of-Pocket Spending” or “TROOP,” which triggers
catastrophic coverage).
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Even with supplemental insurance for medical and prescription drug expenses,
retirees still face out-of-pocket expenses for cost-sharing obligations, when they use
care covered by their policies, and for items or services not covered by Medicare or
supplemental coverage. Of course, they are also subject to premiums for Medicare
and supplemental coverage, as described above. According to one study, the major
components of out-of-pocket spending in 2006 were: premiums (39%), long-term
care (19%), medical providers and supplies (15%), prescription drugs (14%), dental
(6%), and inpatient and outpatient hospital costs (5%).62 Excluding long-term care
costs from this data, premiums are nearly 50% of total costs, medical providers and
supplies are 19%, and prescription drugs are 17%.63 Out-of-pocket exposure to
prescription drug costs—a cost highly variable among retirees—will decrease under
PPACA, as discussed below,64 but will nonetheless remain a major component of
retiree expenditures, especially for intensive users of prescription drugs.65
B. MEASURING OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES
There is no single obvious benchmark for retiree out-of-pocket spending.
Previous research on retiree out-of-pocket expenditures has yielded a range of
different estimates of spending,66 depending on what data source is used or what
particular categories of spending are included or excluded, as discussed below.
Acknowledging the lack of a single definitive savings target, we designed our survey
questions so that we could obtain data in a manner congruent with leading studies, in
which experts estimate costs in two main ways: annual cost and the net present value
(NPV) at age sixty-five of total lifetime healthcare spending throughout retirement.
1. Two Methods of Estimating Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
a. Annual Estimates
One common way to measure and project retiree out-of-pocket healthcare
expenditures is on a periodic basis, such as average monthly or annual expenditures.
We rely on a 2010 Urban Institute study by Johnson and Mommaerts for
benchmarks for respondents’ monthly spending estimates (Table One) because it is
the most recent comprehensive set of estimates. This study reports estimates on an
individual basis at decade intervals from 2010 to 2040 for each quartile of the

62
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 70. On average, across all forms of supplemental coverage,
the costs of premiums tend to comprise between 40% and 60% of total out-of-pocket expenses and
cost-sharing and costs of uncovered healthcare make up the rest. Id. at 72.
63
Author’s analysis of data in Figure 7.2 in id. at 70 (on file with the authors).
64
See infra note 136.
65
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
66
See, e.g., F RONSTIN ET AL ., supra note 1; Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, The Level
and Risk of Out-of Pocket Healthcare Spending (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Working Paper
No. 2009-218, 2009); Anthony Webb & Natalia Zhivan, How Much Is Enough? The Distribution of
Lifetime Healthcare Costs (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2010-1, 2010); see
also Goldman & Zissimopoulos, supra note 44, at 194; Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care
Costs for Couples Retiring in 2011 Will Drop to $230K in One-Time Reduction, F IDELTY.COM (Mar.
31, 2011), http://www.fidelity.com/inside-fidelity/individual-investing/2011-rhcce [hereinafter
Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care Costs]; Retirees Face Estimated $240,000 in Medical
Costs, F IDELITY VIEWPOINTS (May 16, 2012), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirees-medicalexpenses.
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spending distribution and excludes long-term care spending.67 It projects that a
retiree will spend on average $3278 in 2010 and at the median will spend $2583 in
2010, $3284 in 2020, $4569 in 2030, and $6214 in 2040—all in constant 2008
dollars—as reported in Table One.68 For someone at the seventy-fifth percentile of
the spending distribution, among all retirees, Johnson and Mommaerts estimates
$3934 in 2010, $4959 in 2020, $6855 in 2030, and $9455 in 2040.69 Based on these
figures, the share of adults who spend more than one-fifth of household income on
healthcare will grow to 45% in 2040, from 18% in 2010.70
Table One: Annual Spending Benchmarks
25th Percentile
Median Annual
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
Annual Estimate
Estimate
Annual Estimate
Annual Estimate
(Monthly)
(Monthly)
(Monthly)
(Monthly)
2010
$1909 ($159)
$2583 ($215)
$3934 ($330)
$5854 ($488)
2020
$2453 ($204)
$3284 ($274)
$4959 ($413)
$7272 ($606)
2030
$3398 ($283)
$4569 ($381)
$6855 ($571)
$10,053 ($838)
2040
$4595 ($383)
$6214 ($518)
$9455 ($788)
$13,971 ($1164)
Source: RICHARD W. JOHNSON & CORINA MOMMAERTS, URBAN INST., RETIREMENT POLICY PROGRAM,
WILL HEALTHCARE COSTS BANKRUPT AGING BOOMERS? (2010).
Note: Expressed in constant 2008 dollars. Excludes long-term care spending. Uses Medicare Boards of
Trustees 2009 intermediate growth rate of 2.8%. Estimates generated using Urban Institute DYNASIM3
micro simulation model and healthcare spending data in MEPS.

Other studies that have estimated annual costs are less useful as benchmarks for
our purposes, because they are less comprehensive (e.g., don’t include estimates at
different percentiles of spending), are older, or include long-term care, but they
triangulate roughly with and validate the reasonableness of relying on the Johnson
and Mommaerts’ figures as benchmark estimates.71 None of these studies, including
Johnson and Mommaerts, considers changes to spending that will result from
PPACA. This means that for some retirees, spending could be as much as 20% to
30% lower than these estimates, based on reductions to out-of-pocket prescription
drug spending under Medicare Part D and adjustments to the terms of Medigap Plan
F, as explained below.72 For others, it will remain similar.73 On the other hand, all of
67
JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6 (using the Urban Institute DYNASIM3 model to
simulate insurance coverage and project spending as a function of insurance coverage and 2006
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data on insurance coverage and 2006 MEPS data, which only
includes community-dwelling individuals, on out-of-pocket costs. They exclude the costs of long-term
care and indicate that they use a 2009 intermediate growth rate of 2.8% for medical cost growth,
which they say they have based on Medicare Trustees’ projections).
68
Id. at 11.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 13.
71
A Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of 2006 MCBS data, which includes long-term care
costs, reports average per capita cost in 2006 of $4241; no medians are available. KFF CHARTBOOK ,
supra note 4, at 70. Long-term care costs were 19% on average, which means average annual out-ofpocket spending was just over $3400 when excluding long-term care, slightly more than $100 higher
than Johnson and Mommaerts’ average ($3278). Id.; JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS , supra note 6, at 11.
CMS estimated average annual out-of-pocket spending of $3800 for an individual retired in 2007,
again with no medians reported. MUNNELL ET AL ., supra note 6, at 3.
72
This estimate is based on comparing EBRI’s estimated median spending for a man and a
woman with wraparound Medicare coverage from 2009, before PPACA, to their estimate in 2010,
after PPACA. F RONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9 (estimating costs after PPACA); see also P AUL
FRONSTIN ET AL ., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST ., NO . 6, SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES IN
RETIREMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF P ERSONS AGES 55 AND 65 IN 2009 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_06-June09.HlthSvg-RetFndg1.pdf (estimating costs in
2009, before PPACA).
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these studies are at least several years old and would be higher if updated to 2012
spending levels.
While the effect of PPACA could mean that the Johnson and Mommaerts
longer-range estimates are too high, this study nonetheless projects that the typical
retiree will spend in excess of $200 a month on healthcare costs now and a good deal
more than that a decade or more down the road.
b. Lifetime Spending
A second way to estimate retiree healthcare expenditures is based on lifetime
spending, or the net present value at age sixty-five of spending throughout
retirement. This estimate is particularly important for retirees who will finance
expenditures mostly out of savings, rather than out of cash flow. As a lump-sum
benchmark, we rely on a 2010 Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) report
by Fronstin et al., summarized in Table Two, which we chose both because it was
the only study we found that incorporates the effects of PPACA on retiree out-ofpocket spending and it generates estimates at different percentiles of spending.74
This study reports estimated median lifetime retiree healthcare costs of $65,000 for a
man and $93,000 for a woman ($158,000 for a couple) retiring in 2010, not
including long-term care expenses and using Medicare Boards of Trustees excess
cost growth estimates.75 For someone retiring in 2020, the estimates are considerably
higher ($109,000 median estimate for a man and $156,000 for a woman and seventyfifth percentile estimate of $198,000 for a man and $230,000 for a woman).76 These
estimates are based on individuals with median drug expenditures and “wraparound”
Medicare coverage (i.e., Parts A, B, D and Medigap Plan F).77 The EBRI estimates
are similar for an individual with supplemental ESI, whose employer contributes to
coverage, but nearly 70% higher in the case of no employer contribution.78 Because,
as noted above,79 beneficiaries with supplemental Medigap spend more out-ofpocket than those with most other forms of supplemental coverage (or with no
coverage), some of our respondent population would have expected spending lower
than these benchmarks.

73
Id. (estimates for retirees with employment-based supplemental coverage vary less, showing a
decrease of 3% to 10%).
74
FRONSTIN ET AL ., supra note 1, at 9. This benchmark study uses MEPS data, which excludes
institutionalized patients (i.e., those in residential nursing home care) who tend to be more expensive,
which could make the EBRI estimates lower than they would be if the entire population were
considered.
75
Id. Authors don’t indicate the figure they are using for excess cost growth, but the 2011
Medicare Trustees report assumed excess cost growth of 1.4% for Medicare Parts A and B and 2.5%
for Part D for the first ten years and assumes growth of GDP plus one after year seventy-five.
Estimates for years ten to twenty-five are based on linear interpolation between year ten and twentyfive. B DS. OF TRS., F ED . HOSP. INS. & F ED . S UPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS , 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST F UNDS 12 [hereinafter BDS. OF TRUSTEES 2011],
available at https://www.cms.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2011.pdf.
76
Id.
77
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
78
Id. at 9 (median estimate of $109,000 for a man and $146,000 for a woman and seventy-fifth
percentile estimate of $165,000 for a man and $192,000 for a woman retiring in 2010 with
unsubsidized ESI).
79
See KFF CHARTBOOK , supra note 4, at 72.
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Table Two: Lifetime Spending Benchmarks
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
Estimate
Estimate
Man retiring in 2010
$65,000
$118,000
$187,000
Woman retiring in 2010
$93,000
$137,000
$213,000
Man retiring in 2020
$109,000
$198,000
$313,000
Woman retiring in 2020
$156,000
$230,000
$357,000
Source: PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., NO. 351, ISSUE BRIEF: FUNDING SAVINGS
NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE (2010).
Note: Excludes long-term care spending and uses Medicare Boards of Trustees intermediate growth rate.
Based upon an individual with wraparound Medicare (Medicare Parts A, B, D, and Medigap Plan F). The
Median Estimate is for someone with median drug spending saving enough to have a 50/50 chance of
covering healthcare out-of-pocket costs. The 75th percentile is their estimate for someone with 75th
percentile drug spending saving for 75% chance of coving healthcare out-of-pocket costs. The 90th
percentile is their estimate for someone with 90th percentile drug spending saving for 90% chance of
coving healthcare out-of-pocket costs.
Median Estimate

The 2010 EBRI estimates are 20% to 30% lower than their own 2009
estimates,80 due mostly to PPACA reforms that reduce Medicare Part D out-ofpocket expenses.81 Other studies, most of which estimate costs for an intact couple,
not individuals, are within 10% to 20% of the EBRI estimates.82
c. Limitations of Expert Studies as Benchmarks
There are limitations in relying on expert studies as benchmarks. First, studies
of retiree out-of-pocket spending rely on a mix of Medicare claims data and survey
data that capture self-reported out-of-pocket spending. Researchers disagree on
which survey data is most accurate83 among the three main datasets, each of which
captures data differently and focuses on a different population: the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS),84 the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),85 and
the Medicare Current Beneficiaries Survey (MCBS).86

80

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
82
In 2011, Fidelity actuaries estimated $230,000 lifetime out-of-pocket spending for the average
couple saving to achieve 75% certainty of sufficiency (comparable to the above-cited EBRI estimate
of $255,000 for a couple). See Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care Costs, supra note 66; see
FIDELITY
VIEWPOINTS
(May
20,
2010),
also
Putting
a
Price
on
Health,
https://guidance.fidelity.com/viewpoints-workplace/putting-a-price-on-health-pr. A 2010 study by
Webb & Zhivan estimates $197,000 in 2009 dollars for an average couple (most comparable to the
EBRI $158,000 median) with a high school education and free of chronic disease at age 65, excluding
long-term care expenses. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 37. This study uses a 4.2% rate of
inflation-adjusted cost growth, based on 1960-2007 experience. Using a lower rate of 3.2%, based on
CMS projections from 2007, they calculate an NPV that is 11% lower. This study excludes Medicaideligible households, those with long-term care insurance, and those with zero medical expenses and
assumes that households are not subject to spending constraints, focusing on those who will finance
most out-of-pocket spending on their own. Id. at 4.
83
For example, Hurd & Rohwedder caution that the data in the HRS study is higher than the
other two surveys by as much as 50% at the mean. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17 tbl.6. In
contrast, Samuel Marshall, Kathleen McGarry and Jonathan Skinner disagree that the HRS numbers
are inflated, even if higher. Samuel Marshall et al., The Risk of Out-of-Pocket Healthcare
Expenditures at End of Life, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16170, 2010). They
argue the detailed questions in the HRS elicit data that respondents may omit in other studies. Id. HRS
also conducts “exit interviews” with relatives of deceased participants to capture spending in the last
year of life and uses “unfolding brackets” to reduce non-response, both of which increase estimates
and, perhaps, accuracy. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 8.
84
HRS is a long-running biennial panel survey that is broader than healthcare and collects data
from about 20,000 individuals fifty-one or older. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 4. This survey
81

RETIREE OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTHCARE SPENDING

15

Second, studies are inconsistent in what out-of-pocket costs they capture in
estimates, particularly with regard to costs for treatment not covered by insurance,
such as dental care and vision care, and the costs of long-term care. For example,
some studies exclude institutional long-term care costs (e.g., assisted living facility
or nursing home),87 which generally include little medical care costs, when
estimating healthcare costs on the theory that most people do not (and perhaps
should not) save for long-term care costs in light of the availability of Medicaid as a
safety net.88
Finally, estimating future medical costs—both for experts and for untrained
individuals—is an uncertain science because of the unpredictable nature of medical
cost inflation and policy uncertainty, as discussed further below.89 Researchers have
to make assumptions about both of these factors that, at times, feel like little more
than a shot in the dark. Medical care costs have been growing at a faster rate than the
rest of the economy for some time now. From 1975 to 2008, Medicare spending
grew on average 2.5 percentage points faster per year than the GDP, and overall
medical spending grew on average 1.9 percentage points faster than the GDP.90 It is
difficult to predict to what extent this level of growth will and can persist going
forward. Most studies we cite rely upon projections of future cost growth made by
the Medicare Boards of Trustees, calculated annually by the Office of the Actuary
(OACT). OACT statistically models costs for the first ten years into the future and
economically models the last fifty-one years of the seventy-five year projection
period, using a linear interpolation to connect year ten to year twenty-five.91 Until
asks about all categories of out-of-pocket spending, including prescription drugs but focuses less on
such inquiries than other studies do. Id.
85
MEPS is a two-year household panel survey of community-dwelling individuals (i.e. excludes
nursing home residents), which has a smaller sample of the older population than HRS and thus lower
expenditures per person on average. See GARY ENGELHARDT & J ONATHAN GRUBER, CTR. FOR R ET.
RESEARCH BOS. COLL., NO. 11-8, DOES MEDICARE PART D P ROTECT THE ELDERLY FROM F INANCIAL
RISK? (2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IB_11-8-508.pdf. MEPS
triangulates data from the patient survey with a provider survey. Some believe the data to be better
quality. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 4.
86
MCBS is a rotating four-year panel survey of people enrolled in Medicare, who may reside in
either community or long-term care facilities, and asks participants to keep health spending diaries to
capture data in more detail and more accurately. Id. at 4-5.
87
See KFF CHARTBOOK , supra note 4, at 68-73. Because long-term care takes many forms, some
studies do, however, pick up some long-term expenditures for non-institutional patients, including
short term nursing home stays, home-based care, or post-acute care, especially when financed by
Medicare.
88
Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 3.
89
John N. Friedman, Predicting Medicare Cost Growth, in IMPROVING HEALTH C ARE COST
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE P OPULATION: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 83, 83 app. A (Gooloo S.
Wunderlich rapporteur, 2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52808/
pdf/TOC.pdf (describing the different methodologies used to calculate Medicare cost growth and the
limitations of each); see also BDS. OF TRS., F ED . HOSP . INS. & F ED . SUPPLEMENTARY MED . INS.
TRUST FUNDS , 2012 ANNUAL R EPORT OF THE B OARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE F EDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL S UPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST F UNDS 12-20 (describing
the complex methodology used to project Medicare cost growth); Memorandum from John D. Shatto
& M. Kent Clemens, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of the Actuary, on Projected
Medicare Expenditures Under Illustrative Scenarios with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare
Providers (May 18, 2012) (on file with authors) (explaining generally the difficulty in deciding on
Medicare cost growth projections under PPACA).
90
CONG. B UDGET OFFICE , supra note 27, at 27.
91
See IMPROVING HEALTH C ARE COST P ROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE P OPULATION:
SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP , supra note 89, at 7-8 (describing OACT’s methodologies for projecting
Medicare expenditures). OACT projects each category of spending for the first ten years into the
future, using “demographically-adjusted extrapolations of past cost growth.” Id. OACT then uses a
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2012, OACT has assumed that for the final fifty-one years, long-term cost growth
will be GDP plus 1%, based on an assumption that one of several forces will serve as
a brake on long-term cost growth to slow down the rate over time.92 Despite
considerable efforts made to project long-term medical cost growth, these estimates
involve significant guesswork and can have a large impact on study results.93 This
means that even as we use the Johnson and Mommaerts and EBRI estimates as a
proxy for likely future spending, we acknowledge that they are necessarily an
imperfect proxy and actual spending may differ from these estimates.
2. A Note on Demographics and Spending Variation
While most spending variation is uncertain, as discussed further in Part C
below, certain observable factors hold predictive value and together explain an
estimated 20% to 25% of spending variation on a population basis.94 Predictive
factors include income, sex/longevity, and health status.
Higher income or wealth corresponds to greater out-of-pocket expenditures,
reflecting that to some extent retiree healthcare spending is discretionary, especially
if long-term care costs are included.95 A 2010 study by Marshall et al. reports
median expenditures of $5061 in the last year of life ($11,618 on average), but those
in the highest income quintile have median spending of $6761 ($14,269 on average),
as compared to median spending of $2689 for the lowest quintile ($9046 on
average).96 This differential means that the median retiree in the top quintile of
income spends nearly 2.5 times more in the last year of life than the median retiree
in the lowest. Wealth matters even more than income, with median spending in the
top quintile in the Marshall study ($8381) four times that in the bottom ($2013), due
to higher spending in all categories, including insurance, drugs, and home care.97
This study concludes that higher-income retirees are buying independence, which
the authors assert could be one way that wealth buys health.98 Other studies show
that spending is also higher for higher-income retirees in years prior to the last year
Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) to forecast years twenty-five to seventy-five and fill
in the median timeframe through linear interpolation between year ten and twenty-five. Id. This
method benefits from capturing “endogenous growth reduction” as healthcare consumes more of
income, but does not take into account heterogeneity of preferences and assumes that healthcare
operates as a standard good, not dealing with issues of moral hazard, adverse selection, or supply-side
incentives for use of care. Id. at 7.
92
The model does not specify how such slowdown would occur, but it might occur in theory
though increased supply and decreased demand as more of income is taken up by out-of-pocket costs
or due to policy changes. Id. at 8. Parties disagreed over the appropriate assumption for long-term
medical cost growth in 2012 in light of the policy changes enacted by PPACA. Memorandum from
Shatto & Clemens, supra note 89, at 1.
93
Other governmental offices use different methods and, for example, the Congressional Budget
Office’s (CBO) estimates are higher than the OACT estimates because the only brake on cost growth
that CBO assumes is that non-healthcare consumption will not decline. See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE
COST PROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE P OPULATION: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP , supra note 89, at 8.
94
Newhouse, supra note 22.
95
Goldman & Zissimopoulos, supra note 44, at 197 exhibit 2 (reporting spending for low, middle
and high income earners with increasing out-of-pocket spending as income increases); Marshall et al.,
supra note 83, at 4 (finding that spending in the last year of life is greater at higher income quartiles).
Low incomes is defined as less than $12,600, middle as $12,600 to $38,860, and high income as above
$38,860, all in 1998 dollars); De Nardi et al., supra note 11, at 53 fig.3 (modeling average medical
expensive by permanent income quintile from age 74 to 100 and showing increased spending at each
income quintile, including nursing home costs).
96
Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 25.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 4.
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of life, with spending for those above 400% of the FPL nearly twice of those below
100% of the FPL.99
Another major determinant of total lifetime spending is gender, due to longevity
and the fact that women less often have employer-sponsored supplemental retiree
coverage and buy expensive Medigap policies instead.100 For those turning sixty-five
in 2007, the average life expectancy for a man was eighty-two and for a woman was
eighty-five.101 As noted above, the 2010 EBRI study estimates lifetime out-of-pocket
spending of $65,000 to $118,000 for a man at the fiftieth to seventy-fifth percentile
and $93,000 to $137,000 for a woman,102 which means women retiring in 2010 are
expected to spend 43% more than men at the median and 16% more at the seventyfifth percentile. Studies also indicate that women have higher average annual out-ofpocket spending.103
Some factors, such as health status and age, have less straightforward effects.
While annual expenditures are more for those identifying as in poor health, they live
shorter lives and have lower total lifetime out-of-pocket expenditures. An
individual’s health in any one year affects the out-of-pocket costs she will incur in
that year and to a limited degree may predict costs in a future year.104 One study
indicates that an individual with self-reported poor health spent as much as 30% to
40% more in 2006 ($5030) than someone reporting very good ($3744) or excellent
($3542) health.105 On the other hand, another study by Sun et al. shows that the
healthier retirees spend more in total over their retirement years because they live for
and incur costs over more years.106 While this study concurs that healthier retirees
spend less on average annually,107 the authors estimate that for a couple turning
sixty-five in 2009, the average lifetime cost is $220,000, where one or both suffer
from chronic disease, as compared to $260,000 for a couple free of chronic
disease.108 These estimates suggest the healthy spend nearly 20% more over a
lifetime than those with chronic disease.109 Those in poorer health also have less
99
See, e.g., NEUMAN ET AL ., supra note 44, at 2 (reporting mean spending of $2761 under 100%,
$4001 at 100% to 199%, $4406 from 200% to 300%, and $4997 above 400% of FPL, including longterm care spending).
100
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.
101
Actuarial Life Table, 2007, S OC. SEC. ADMIN . (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
STATS/table4c6.html. Twenty-five percent of men would live to eighty-seven and women to ninety,
and 10% of men would live until ninety-one and women to ninety-five. Id.
102
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. These are the estimates for beneficiaries with
wraparound Medicare coverage.
103
See, e.g. NEUMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 (reporting a mean spending of $4281 for a
woman and $3765 for a man and median spending of $2908 and $2532, all for 2005 and including
long-term care). Because this study included long-term care expenditures, it is less useful to us as a
benchmark.
104
Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 9 (describing persistence of bad health/high spending
and good health/low spending as present but not perfect); see NEUMAN ET AL ., supra note 44, at 2
(finding health to be an important factor for high annual costs); Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 15
(concluding that “current good health provides only a very limited guarantee of future good health”).
105
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 71 fig.7.3 (including long-term care costs).
106
WEI S UN ET AL ., CTR. FOR R ET. RESEARCH B OS. COLL., NO . 10-8, DOES STAYING HEALTHY
REDUCE YOUR LIFETIME HEALTHCARE C OSTS? (2010).
107
Id. at 2 (reporting that in 2009, excluding nursing home care, a household where the husband
is age seventy to seventy-four and in good health will spend $6000 on average compared to $7416 for
a household with a husband not in good health—defined as having ever been diagnosed with a chronic
disease).
108
Id. at 1 (including home health and nursing home costs, but not costs of assisted living
facilities or long-term care insurance premiums).
109
See id.
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asset accumulation, both because of depletion and because of slower asset
accumulation, which could explain lower spending.110
Likewise, it is not clear what effect, if any, advancing age has on annual out-ofpocket costs, except that proximity to death corresponds with higher annual
healthcare costs.111 Marshall et al. found average expenses in the last year of life of
$11,618 with out-of-pocket spending as high as $29,335 at the ninetieth percentile
and $94,310 at the ninety-ninth percentile, including long-term care.112 Average
annual healthcare costs do increase with cohort age113—for the average cohort
member—but studies suggest this increase largely reflects increased probability of
death and high end-of-life costs, due to chronic disease and long-term care costs,
that are more common for any one member of a cohort at older ages.114 For example,
Hurd and Rohwedder report median annual spending for care (excluding premiums)
for a non-institutionalized sixty-five to sixty-nine year old of $720, seventy-five to
seventy-nine year old of $880, and an over eighty-five year old of $950, based on
HRS data.115 Thus, studies show a slow upward incline of average spending for
cohorts at older ages. But age may be unreliable for predicting individual spending,
unless used to gauge proximity to death.
In sum, we know certain factors are predictive of higher healthcare spending,
including sex (women spend as much as 40% more than men, excluding long-term
care), higher income or wealth (can more than double spending), poor health status
(higher for annual spending but lower by as much as 20% for lifetime spending), and
proximity to death. We consider below whether respondents’ answers vary as expert
studies report actual spending does based on these demographic factors.
C. UNCERTAINTY IN HEALTHCARE COSTS
To a large degree, any one individual’s future costs are unpredictable. The
median benchmark estimates, discussed above, belie the variability in costs among
retirees and over time, based on three major sources of uncertainty: the skewed
distribution of costs among retirees based on individual health experience,
unexpected excess healthcare cost growth, and policy uncertainty.
110
James M. Poterba et al., The Asset Cost of Poor Health 18-19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16389, 2010).
111
See generally Marshall et al., supra note 83, (finding that “out-of-pocket expenditures are
often elusive” and represent a large drain on financial resources, especially for households nearing
death). See also Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 7; Meena Seshamani & Alastair M. Gray, A
Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Age and Time to Death on Hospital Costs, 23 J. HEALTH ECON.
217, 230 (2004) (“Average hospital costs increased seven-fold in the last three years of life, compared
to a 30% increase from age 65-80.”).
112
Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 2. This study uses data from HRS exit interviews and
normalizes spending to a twelve month period. The authors seek to omit outliers that might be
erroneous. A large part of this spending, particularly at the high ends of the distribution, is for longterm care, which is beyond the scope of this study.
113
Micah Hartman et al., U.S. Health Spending by Age, Selected Years Through 2004, 27
HEALTH AFF. W2 (Nov. 2007) (with respect to total expenditures, insured and out-of-pocket, showing
a doubling from cohorts ages sixty-five to seventy-four to ages seventy-five to eighty-four, and a
tripling between ages sixty-five to seventy-four and over eighty-five); see also Webb & Zhivan, supra
note 66, at 7 (reporting increasing out-of-pocket spending by age). But see Susan T. Stewart, Do Outof-Pocket Health Expenditures Rise with Age Among Older Americans?, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 48, 5051 (2004) (reporting generally no increase in out-of-pocket costs when long-term care spending is
excluded and certain costs, including hospital costs, decrease).
114
Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 2, 22.
115
Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17. Their mean and median estimates based on MCBS
and MEPS data are lower. Id.
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1. Individual Health Experience
The distribution of healthcare costs is notoriously skewed with a long,
expensive tail for some.116 The top 5% of Medicare beneficiaries account for 43% of
total spending, and the top 25% account for 85% of spending.117 The demographic
factors discussed above only predict 20% to 25% of variability in spending,118 which
means there is significant unpredictable spending variability among retirees.
Studies suggest that more intensive users of healthcare—those at the seventyfifth or ninetieth percentile of spending among retirees—can easily spend two to
three times the amount the typical retiree spends. Johnson and Mommaerts estimate,
for example, annual out-of-pocket costs in 2010 that range from $1909 at the twentyfifth percentile to $2583 at the median to $5854 at the ninetieth percentile (see Table
One).119 Studies that include estimates at the ninety-ninth percentile report annual
out-of-pocket spending of over $20,000 for the very highest spenders.120 With regard
to total lifetime retiree spending, the EBRI study estimates median lifetime retiree
healthcare costs of $65,000 for a man retiring in 2010 with wraparound Medicare
coverage.121 At the seventy-fifth and ninetieth percentile of spending, the estimates
increase to $118,000 and $187,000—a near doubling to tripling of costs above the
median.122 For a woman, the variability is slightly less, ranging from median
spending of $93,000 to $213,000 at ninetieth percentile, which still represents over a
doubling.123 For the most part, it is impossible to know in advance which individuals
will have more or less intensive needs, posing a challenge for individual retirement
planning.
2. Healthcare Cost Growth
Uncertainty with respect to medical care cost growth also complicates
estimating future out-of-pocket exposure. As discussed above, while the Medicare
Trustees’ long-term projection of Medicare cost growth has been GDP plus 1% in
recent years,124 historical excess healthcare cost growth has been over 2% in recent
decades—2.5% for Medicare and 1.9% overall from 1975 to 2008.125 For excess cost
growth to be closer to 1% or less in the future, a number of the Trustees’
assumptions must prove true, including the questionable assumption that Congress

116
Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited,
20 HEALTH AFF. 9 (2001).
117
See James D. Reschovsky et al., Following the Money: Factors Associated with the Cost of
Treating High-Cost Medicare Beneficiaries, 46 HEALTH S ERVICES RES. 998 (2011).
118
Newhouse, supra note 22, at 1256.
119
JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS , supra note 6, at 11.
120
Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17 (explaining that based on HRS data for a retiree in
the sixty-five to sixty-nine age bracket, they estimate $720 at the median and $21,950 at the ninetyninth percentile; for those eighty-five and older, spending is $950 at the median to $25,150 at the
ninety-ninth percentile).
121
FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
122
Id.
123
Id. For a couple turning sixty-five in 2009, one study estimated a doubling of expenditures
from $260,000 on average to $570,000 at the ninety-fifth percentile, including nursing home care but
excluding the costs of assisted living facilities. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 20. Excluding all
nursing home care, the average and ninety-fifth percentile estimates were $197,000 and $311,000—
still an over 50% increase from the mean to the ninety-fifth percentile. Id.
124
BDS. OF TRUSTEES 2011, supra note 75, at 202-04.
125
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE , supra note 27, at 27 (reporting that from 1975-2008, excess cost
growth in Medicare was 2.5%, in Medicaid was 2.0%, in all other was 1.8%, and overall was 1.9%).
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does not override policies that limit increases in the physician fee schedule.126 In
addition, PPACA created a new entity, known as the Independent Payment Advisory
Board (IPAB), tasked with managing Medicare expenditure to keep cost growth to
under GDP plus 1%,127 but it faces constraints that might impede its ability to
accomplish this goal,128 assuming it survives Congressional attempts at repealing
it.129
If healthcare costs were to grow at GDP plus 2% instead of GDP plus 1%, the
out-of-pocket costs of an average retiree would increase on the order of 10% over
the lifetime of a typical retiree with an additional increase of approximately 10% for
every additional percentage point by which out-of-pocket costs exceed GDP growth.
This unexpected medical care cost growth is unlikely to have as dramatic effects as
intensive individual medical care needs, but it is significant nonetheless.
3. Policy Instability
Finally, policy changes, especially those made to the Medicare program, will
shape future retiree costs in significant and unpredictable ways. With Medicare costs
escalating as a percent of the total federal budget, from just over 2% a decade ago to
3.6% in 2010,130 Medicare reform is a priority for policymakers in both parties.
Some reform proposals, including that in Representative Paul Ryan’s “Path to
Prosperity” fiscal year 2013 budget plan that the House of Representatives passed in
March of 2012,131 attempt to curb future federal budget spending on healthcare by
converting Medicare from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution program.132
This approach fixes federal government spending to the amount of a “premium
support payment” per retiree, which retirees can use to buy a private insurance plan.
If premium support payments grow more slowly than healthcare costs over time,133
as anticipated, their relative value will decrease. Many retirees will be able to afford
only less comprehensive insurance plans and will face greater risk of high exposure
in any one year.
As one potential indicator of how significant such changes might be, the
Congressional Budget Office in 2011 estimated (admittedly with quite stylized
assumptions) that Representative Ryan’s Medicare reform proposal could more than

126

See Bruce C. Vladeck, Fixing Medicare’s Physician Payment System, 362 NEW ENG . J. MED.
1955 (2010).
127
Henry Aaron, The Independent Payment Advisory Board – Congress’s “Good Deed,” 364
NEW ENG . J. MED . 2377 (2011).
128
Id. at 2378-79.
129
Editorial, We Thought They Were Worried About Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at A30.
130
KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 79.
131
H.R. Con. Res. 112, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing to replace Medicare with a “premium
support” program); see also HENRY J. KAISER F AMILY FOUND., PROPOSED C HANGES TO MEDICARE IN
THE “P ATH TO P ROSPERITY ” 1 (April 2011) (summarizing terms of Paul Ryan plan).
132
PAUL R YAN , HOUSE BUDGET COMM., THE P ATH TO P ROSPERITY: A B LUEPRINT FOR
AMERICAN RENEWAL 52-55 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/fy2013prosperity/. Several
plans, including Representative Ryan’s and legislation introduced by Senators Lieberman and Coburn
in 2011, also propose to increase the Medicare eligibility age to sixty-seven. Id.; see also Rick Unger,
The Coburn-Lieberman Medicare Proposal - The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, FORBES (June 29,
2011, 12:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/06/29/the-coburn-lieberman-medicareproposal-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/.
133
RYAN, supra note 132, at 53.
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double a typical retiree’s share of healthcare costs by 2022 with further increases in
the following decade.134
The fate of current policies that limit retiree out-of-pocket spending, including
Part D and PPACA, will also greatly affect future exposure. PPACA is expected to
reduce retiree out-of-pocket expenditures on net.135 Most importantly, it will
decrease out-of-pocket spending for prescription drugs under Medicare Part D by
$43 billion over ten years, by closing the so-called “donut hole,” a gap in Part D
coverage of prescription drug spending.136 An EBRI estimate suggests that while
PPACA has little impact on someone with median prescription drug expenditures, it
decreases out-of-pocket spending for someone in the ninetieth percentile of spending
by as much as one-third.137 Other PPACA policies eliminate cost-sharing for
preventive care138 and intend to slow Medicare cost growth overall, such as through
the creation of the IPAB, discussed above, and through delivery reforms.139
Uncertainties exist regarding whether these policies will actually save money and, if
they do, whether they will reduce out-of-pocket costs or simply lower federal
outlays, preserving current levels of out-of-pocket spending.
On the other hand, certain PPACA policies could increase out-of-pocket
expenditures for retirees. For example, PPACA reduces the rates Medicare will pay
to private Medicare Advantage plans, which were historically compensated at rates
about 10% higher than what the government spent for Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries.140 CBO estimates that this reduction will cause enrollment in Medicare
Advantage plans to drop to 9.1 million enrollees in 2019 (compared to a pre-reform
estimate of 13.9 million).141 Since these plans can protect retirees relatively well
against out-of-pocket exposure, their reduction would likely result in higher
expenditures for some beneficiaries. Over time, PPACA might hasten the already
ongoing erosion of ESI retiree supplemental plans,142 through policies including the
134
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE , LONG-TERM ANALYSIS OF A B UDGET P ROPOSAL BY C HAIRMAN
RYAN (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12128/04
-05-ryan_letter.pdf.
135
ROBERT BERENSON & JOHN HOLOHAN , R OBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URBAN INSTIT.,
HOW WILL THE PATIENT P ROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AFFECT SENIORS?: TIMELY
ANALYSIS OF HEALTH P OLICY ISSUES 1-2 (2010).
136
Id. at 2. Part D led to a reduction of $180 in annual out-of-pocket costs for the median
participant and $800 at the ninetieth percentile. E NGELHARDT & GRUBER, supra note 85, at 3-4. Prior
to PPACA, after just over $3000 in spending, retirees would enter the so-called “donut hole” in
coverage where they had to pay 100% of the next $3610 in spending before reaching the “catastrophic
coverage” level ($6440 in 2010), after which Medicare and the plan together pay 95% of the costs. A
beneficiary would spend $4550 total out-of-pocket on cost-sharing before qualifying for catastrophic
coverage. HENRY J. KAISER F AMILY F OUND., MEDICARE PRIMER 7 (2010).
137
PAUL F RONSTIN ET AL ., EMP. B ENEFIT R ES. INST., NO . 8, NOTES: THE IMPACT OF REPEALING
PPACA ON S AVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE 3
(2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/Notes.Aug11.PPACA-Final.pdf.
138
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 4104–4108,
124 Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1396).
139
See BERENSON & HOLAHAN , supra note 135, at 2-4 (discussing PPACA efforts to reduce
provider payment rates through the IPAB, Accountable Care Organizations, and other delivery reform
policies).
140
Id. at 2.
141
CONG. B UDGET OFFICE , COMPARISON OF P ROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE PLANS AND SUBSIDIES FOR EXTRA BENEFITS NOT COVERED BY MEDICARE UNDER
CURRENT LAW AND UNDER R ECONCILIATION LEGISLATION C OMBINED WITH H.R. 3590 AS PASSED BY
THE S ENATE (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/
doc11379/macomparisons.pdf.
142
See supra note 47.
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so-called “Cadillac Tax,” an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health
coverage.143 Starting in 2018, benefits worth more than $10,200 for an individual
retiree or $27,500 for two or more individuals will be subject to a 40% excise tax.144
While this tax may not have a large effect at first because of high thresholds (set
even higher for retirees than for employees), these thresholds will grow more slowly
than healthcare costs so that a larger portion of benefits are taxed over time.145 The
result might be increased cost-shifting to retirees or decreased availability of ESI for
retirees.
The effect of potential policy changes range from small to considerable. Certain
policy changes, including the plan proposed by Representative Ryan, might rival the
risks an individual retiree faces of spending more if she incurs individual medical
expenses at the seventy-fifth percentile of spending, which can result in double
median expenses.
III. SURVEY RESULTS
A. SURVEY SAMPLE AND TREATMENTS
The goal of our survey was to explore how well individual expectations
regarding out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures and spending uncertainty match the
views of experts summarized in Part II of this paper. An abbreviated version of the
survey questions appears in the Appendix.146 The survey was conducted in February
and March 2012 through Rand Corporation’s American Life Panel, an internet-based
vehicle designed to survey representative samples of the national population.147 Of
2116 respondents solicited, 1704 returned completed surveys, which is a response
rate of over 80%. Our survey sample was structured to consist of eight age-based
cohorts from ages forty to eighty. Five groups were under the age of sixty-five,
principally those pre-retirement, and three groups were sixty-five and older,
principally those in retirement. The older age cohorts were smaller based on the
composition of the American Life Panel. As explored below, the segmentation of
our sample into age cohorts allowed us to explore the extent to which older
respondents offered different cost estimates than younger respondents.
Table Three reports basic demographics about the weighted sample, which was
52% female, 83% white, with an average age of fifty-six years old, an
143

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001, 124
Stat. 119, amended by I.R.C. § 49801(b) (West 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Other policies could have a similar effect. For example, starting in 2013, the subsidy to
employers who offer retiree drug coverage will also be taxed, eliminating an exemption created under
the Medicare Modernization Act and costing employers an additional $233 per retiree on average that
must be reported as a liability in annual reports. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. B ENEFIT RES. INST , NO . 338,
ISSUE B RIEF: IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH R EFORM FOR R ETIREE HEALTH B ENEFITS 12 (2010),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-2010_No338_Ret-Hlth.pdf.
144
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9001.
145
Id.
146
In an effort to validate the form of the survey, we circulated preliminary versions to a number
of experts and conducted a small pilot survey to ensure that questions were comprehensible and
answers appropriate. In light of comments received in this process, we revised the survey and
attempted to reduce the complexity of the questions to tenth grade reading comprehension level or
lower.
147
For additional information on the Rand American Life Panel, see Panel Composition, RAND
AM. LIFE PANEL , https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=panelcomposition (last updated Sept.
6, 2012).
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unemployment rate of 7.1%, and a mean educational achievement level of 10.6,
equivalent to some college but without obtaining a degree. Table Three also reports
basic demographic data on key subsamples discussed below based on gender, age
cohorts, and income quintiles. Unless otherwise indicated, the survey results
reported in this paper were weighted to be representative of the national population
in the age cohorts we surveyed.148

148
For purposes of the analysis presented here, our survey responses were uniquely weighted to
ensure that our cohort samples are representative of the national population for non-institutionalized
individuals over the age of forty. Rand weights are generated using an iterative raking algorithm
adjusting for gender, education, age, and income. For a general overview of the Rand weights, see
Panel Weighting, RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=weights (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012).
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Table Three: Basic Demographics of Total Sample and Key Subsamples
(weighted data)
N
Total Sample
Mean
Standard Deviation

Age

Female

Married

Income
Levels*

Unemployment
Rate

White

Highest Educational
Achievement**

56.5
10.5

0.52
0.50

0.67
0.47

10.9
4.2

0.07
0.26

0.83
0.38

10.6
2.4

56.2
10.0

0.00
0.00

0.74
0.42

11.3
3.9

0.08
0.26

0.84
0.35

10.6
2.3

56.6
11.0

1.00
0.00

0.60
0.51

10.6
4.4

0.06
0.25

0.82
0.40

10.5
2.5

41.9
1.3

0.51
0.45

0.71
0.41

10.8
3.6

0.11
0.28

0.76
0.39

10.5
2.0

47.2
1.2

0.51
0.45

0.66
0.42

11.1
4.0

0.11
0.28

0.76
0.38

10.1
2.2

52.0
1.3

0.51
0.46

0.68
0.43

10.9
4.3

0.10
0.28

0.76
0.39

10.6
2.1

57.0
1.4

0.52
0.50

0.66
0.48

11.5
4.0

0.07
0.26

0.85
0.36

11.0
2.2

61.8
1.6

0.52
0.55

0.69
0.50

11.2
4.6

0.05
0.24

0.87
0.37

10.9
2.7

66.9
1.7

0.60
0.56

0.64
0.54

11.0
4.4

0.03
0.20

0.92
0.30

10.8
2.8

71.8
1.5

0.50
0.55

0.57
0.54

10.2
4.0

0.00
0.06

0.92
0.30

10.3
2.7

77.2
1.7

0.53
0.54

0.65
0.51

9.4
3.9

0.00
0.00

0.90
0.32

10.0
2.8

56.8
10.6

0.56
0.48

0.41
0.47

4.6
1.9

0.13
0.33

0.68
0.45

9.3
1.9

57.9
11.8

0.56
0.50

0.58
0.50

9.6
1.2

0.07
0.26

0.81
0.39

9.8
2.2

56.4
10.6

0.51
0.51

0.77
0.43

12.5
0.5

0.06
0.24

0.84
0.38

10.7
2.2

55.5
9.5

0.50
0.50

0.80
0.40

14.4
0.5

0.05
0.21

0.91
0.29

11.4
2.2

54.6
8.9

0.43
0.50

0.92
0.28

16.3
0.5

0.03
0.17

0.93
0.26

12.6
2.2

1704

Gender
Male
Mean
Standard Deviation
Female
Mean
Standard Deviation

736

968

Age Cohort
40-44
Mean
Standard Deviation
45-49
Mean
Standard Deviation
50-54
Mean
Standard Deviation
55-59
Mean
Standard Deviation
60-64
Mean
Standard Deviation
65-69
Mean
Standard Deviation
70-74
Mean
Standard Deviation
75-80
Mean
Standard Deviation

210

218

237

249

258

255

168

109

Income Quintile***
First Quintile
Mean
Standard Deviation
Second Quintile
Mean
Standard Deviation
Third Quintile
Mean
Standard Deviation
Fourth Quintile
Mean
Standard Deviation
Fifth Quintile
Mean
Standard Deviation

354

438

267

451

191

* Under the American Life Panel income classification system. 4 represents household incomes of $10,000 to $12,499; 5 represents $12,500 to
$14,499; 6 represents $15,000 to $19,999; 7 represents $20,000 to $24,999; 8 represents $25,000 to $29,999; 9 represents $30,000 to $34,999;
10 represents $35,000 to $39,999; 11 represents $40,000 to $49,999; 12 represents $50,000 to $59,999; 13 represents $60,000 to $74,999; 14
represents $75,000 to $99,999; 15 represents $100,000 to $124,999; 16 represents $125,000 to $199,999; and 17 represents $200,000 or more.
** Under the ALP education classification system, 9 reflects a high school graduate; 10 reflects some college but no degree; 11 reflects an
associate degree in a college occupational/vocational program; 12 reflects an associate degree in a college academic program; and 13 reflects a
bachelor’s degree.
*** Respondents in the first income quintile had household incomes of less than $25,000; those in the second quintile household incomes
between $25,000 and $49,999; those in the third quintile household incomes between $50,000 and $74,999; those in the fourth quintile
household incomes between $75,000 and $124,999; and those in the fifth quintile household incomes $125,000 and higher.
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Our survey questions focused on respondents’ evaluation of their own out-ofpocket healthcare costs in retirement and the components that determine those
costs.149 We asked all respondents to estimate their monthly expenditures for out-ofpocket healthcare costs in retirement. We also asked each respondent to estimate
how much someone like himself or herself would need to save by age sixty-five in
order to have enough money to cover all out-of-pocket healthcare costs during
retirement. The first of these measures was intended to solicit estimates of an
average monthly budget for out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures in retirement,
while the second measure was an attempt to solicit a lump sum estimate of total outof-pocket expenditures throughout retirement. As discussed above, experts employ
similar approaches to measuring out-of-pocket expenditures, with our monthly
budget estimates tracking expert estimates of annual costs and our lump sum
estimates being analogous to the experts’ measure of the NPV of total lifetime
healthcare spending from age sixty-five to the end of life. Among other things, we
were interested in exploring whether the quality of individual estimates of out-ofpocket expenditures would differ based on whether the estimates were expressed in
terms of monthly budgets or lump sum costs. We also asked some of our
respondents to estimate the separate components that determine these costs, such as
likelihood of insurance coverage and premiums for Medicare and supplemental
insurance coverage. Our goal was to ascertain whether respondents were more or
less attuned to any of the component parts that together determine total out-ofpocket spending. We asked respondents to exclude long-term care costs when
estimating out-of-pocket costs for consistency with the benchmark studies.150
In the last section of the survey, we included a module on risk assessment,
where, using two separate formulations, we asked respondents to assess the
potentially important sources of variation in individual retiree healthcare costs
discussed above: individual health and medical needs in retirement, unanticipated
healthcare cost growth during their retirement, and changes in policy affecting
Medicare and other government programs.
To facilitate our analysis of results, we included a few preliminary questions
about respondents’ self-assessments of their own current health status, familiarity
with financial planning and insurance coverage of health costs in retirement, and life
expectancies. Towards the back of the survey, we also included several questions
about long-term healthcare services, which we report in a separate paper.
Finally, to ascertain how sensitive responses on out-of-pocket retiree healthcare
costs might be to how our questions were framed, we divided our respondents into
149
In our survey, we offered respondents the following guidance about the kinds of costs we
were interested in:
“In this survey, we want to find out how much you expect to pay for healthcare in
retirement. We are interested in your out-of-pocket costs. Out-of-pocket costs are any
expenses that you pay yourself. In addition to any direct payments, these costs include
insurance premiums for government programs and other health insurance plans. Out-ofpocket costs also cover deductibles and co-pays. Out-of-pocket costs do not include
payments made on your behalf or reimbursed by government programs or other
insurance plans. In all cases, we are asking about your own personal healthcare costs in
retirement. Do not include healthcare costs of other members of your household. Unless
otherwise indicated, please do not include in your estimates the cost of long-term
residential health-care services (such as extended stays in nursing homes) or premiums
for long-term healthcare insurance. Some questions ask for estimates about costs in the
future. Please do not attempt to adjust your estimates to reflect price increases from
overall inflation. Just make your estimates using the value of money today.”
150
For survey instructions with regard to excluding long-term care cost, see supra note 149.
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three basic treatment groups with varying levels of anchoring information. In
Treatment A, respondents answered a straightforward set of three questions about
out-of-pocket healthcare costs: How much did they expect to spend on average each
month for out-of-pocket costs in retirement? How much did they expect to spend per
month on out-of-pocket costs during the final year of their lives? How much did they
think someone like them would need to save by age sixty-five in order to have
enough money to cover all out-of-pocket healthcare costs throughout retirement? In
the two additional treatments, the hypothesis we hoped to explore was whether
respondents’ assessments of out-of-pocket cost might be affected—and presumably
increased—by prompting them to think about several different components of
healthcare costs. To that end, we asked Treatment B respondents several additional
questions about their expectations regarding the type of health insurance coverage
they anticipated having during retirement and also about the monthly insurance
premiums they expected to pay for that coverage. We also asked Treatment B
respondents to estimate monthly out-of-pocket costs in retirement at three separate
ages: sixty-five, seventy-five, and eighty-five, as well as the final year of their lives.
Finally, in Treatment C, we asked respondents the same additional questions as we
asked of Treatment B respondents and also provided additional information about
average life expectancies, typical insurance premiums, ordinary ratios of premiums
to out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care, and projected increases in medical
healthcare costs above inflation to see whether such anchoring would influence
respondents’ assessments of their own out-of-pocket costs. As we discuss below,
these treatments had a modest effect in some places but less overall effect than we
had hypothesized.
B. ESTIMATING OUT-OF-POCKET RETIREE EXPENDITURES
1. Estimates of Components of Cost (Insurance Coverage and Premiums)
Future out-of-pocket spending can depend in part on future insurance coverage
and insurance premiums. We begin with an overview of our respondents’
expectations with regard to these insurance components.
a. Insurance Coverage
We examined respondents’ expectations regarding insurance coverage in
retirement to test the hypothesis that unrealistic expectations regarding coverage
might lead to underestimation of out-of-pocket obligations and found that
expectations align roughly with expert estimates of coverage levels with a few
exceptions noted below. We asked respondents to estimate the likelihood that
particular insurance programs would provide the respondent coverage for “at least a
portion of your healthcare expenses at some point in retirement.”151 Table Four
presents a summary of responses overall and also by age cohort.152
151

The survey introduction to these questions read as follows:
“Many different government programs and insurance plans can cover healthcare
expenses of retirees. With all these choices, many people are confused which plans and
programs will provide them coverage. The next questions ask how likely you think it is
that particular government programs and insurance plans will cover at least a portion of
your healthcare expenses at some point in retirement. If you are certain that you will be
covered, you should click the ruler on 100%. If you are certain that you will not be
covered, you should click the ruler at 0%. If you think you may be covered but are not
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Table Four: Retiree Health Insurance Coverage Expectations by Cohort and All
Respondents
(estimated likelihood of coverage under various insurance programs; estimates in percentages)
Medicare

Medicaid

Employer-Sponsored

Medigap

N

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

40-44

128

55

29

40

32

33

32

25

26

45-49

157

61

30

44

35

24

32

26

31

50-54

156

68

29

45

34

29

34

26

27

55-59

173

74

22

47

34

35

38

32

30

60-64

158

82

26

30

37

36

43

32

37

65-69

176

89

22

26

37

41

46

29

41

70-74

106

88

24

25

38

33

46

34

43

75-80

75

92

22

28

41

29

44

35

46

All
Respondents

1154

73

29

38

36

32

38

29

34

Age Cohort

Coverage from
Literature
Review

95 percent

15 percent*

33 percent *

17 percent*

* Reflects Percentage of Coverage of Medicare Beneficiaries.

In general, overall responses to these coverage questions reflected actual
coverage levels. Respondents correctly identified Medicare as the program with the
highest expected coverage levels (with a mean response of 73%, as compared to
95% in fact).153 Among the other categories, expectations regarding ESI coverage
(mean response of 32%) were close to the 33% of Medicare beneficiaries reported in
the literature review to have employer-sponsored supplemental coverage. In contrast,
the mean responses for Medicaid (38%) and Medigap (29%) both were in a range of
close to double actual reported coverage levels from our literature review (15% and
17%, respectively).154
The younger age cohorts’ estimates of expected Medicare coverage were much
lower than current levels of participation in the program.155 For the forty to fortysure, click on the scale on the point on the ruler that best reflects your assessment of the
likelihood that you may be covered or type the number reflecting that likelihood in the
box below.”
152
We also surveyed respondents about their expectations regarding coverage from Veterans
Administration programs but do not report those results in this analysis.
153
The mean response can be interpreted as the expected coverage level across all respondents
because we asked each respondent to report the likelihood of personal coverage.
154
While the benchmarks in the literature review might be slightly low, especially with regard to
Medigap for reasons discussed above, any underreporting of Medicaid or Medigap coverage would be
small at most.
155
Here, and elsewhere throughout this Article, we make comparisons between responses of
younger and older cohorts. Where differences are noted, we tested for statistical significance using a
Hodges-Lehman non-parametric estimator for the median differences across groups, incorporating
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four age cohort, the average estimate of Medicare coverage was just over 55%. In
contrast, respondents sixty-five and over estimated a nearly 90% or higher likelihood
of coverage, quite close to actual current coverage levels (95%). In contrast, the
younger cohorts over-estimated the likelihood of Medicaid coverage (at over 40%
likelihood) as compared to actual current coverage levels (15%) and the expectations
of older respondents (at under 30% likelihood). The responses of younger cohorts
might reflect some pragmatic assessment about the availability of Medicare in the
future156 or confusion on the part of younger respondents about the differences
between Medicare and Medicaid, notwithstanding the definition of Medicare
included in our survey. Even for respondents over sixty-five, expectations regarding
the likelihood of Medicaid coverage (in excess of 25%) substantially exceeded
actual coverage levels for retirees (15%).157
Our respondents expressed stable expectations across age cohorts regarding
coverage from ESI programs, even though most industry experts assume that levels
of employer-sponsored coverage will decline over time. As discussed below, a
persistent feature of our survey responses with respect to comprehensive measures of
retiree healthcare costs was the tendency of young cohorts to give quite similar
responses as older respondents, suggesting that younger respondents may not be
anticipating predicted changes in costs or coverage in the coming decades.
Overall, our findings here suggest that respondents’ expectations with regard to
future insurance coverage are not so far off as to drive large scale misestimation of
future out-of-pocket spending.
b. Premium Costs of Insurance
Where respondents from Treatments B and C indicated they expected to
maintain a form of insurance coverage, we also asked what premium cost they
anticipated paying to maintain such coverage in retirement. As above with regard to
insurance coverage, we found that estimates of premiums roughly approximated
actual premiums for both Medicare and supplemental insurance coverage. Table
Five reports the respondent expectations for total Medicare premiums, Medigap
premiums, and ESI premiums. Here and elsewhere below, we report results in terms
of key percentiles of responses (the tenth percentile, twenty-fifth percentile, median,
seventy-fifth percentile, and ninetieth percentile), as well as mean and standard
deviation. The use of percentiles is helpful in interpreting results because responses

probabilistic weighting of data. We used non-parametric tests because in many instances the
distributions of responses were skewed. Unless otherwise indicated, the differences were significant at
the 99% confidence level.
156
On the other hand, as discussed below, the younger cohorts do not estimate consistently
higher levels of out-of-pocket expenses than other cohorts of the sort that one would expect if younger
cohorts were consciously anticipating less generous Medicare coverage in the future.
157
For those respondents in Treatment B and C who indicated that they thought there was some
probability that they would maintain Medicare coverage at some point in retirement, we asked
whether they expect to maintain Part D Prescription Drug Coverage or to participate in Medicare
Advantage. Respondents overwhelming reported that they expect to maintain Part D Prescription Drug
coverage (quite consistent with the 60% coverage levels reported in the expert literature). Of
respondents giving definitive answers, over 75% indicated that they expected to have Part D coverage
(611 of 814). Respondents reported greater uncertainty about Medicare Advantage participation, with
nearly half of all respondents reporting that they did not know or had not decided about the issue.
Those giving a firm answer to the question reported a good deal higher level of Medicare Advantage
take-up (281 of 640 or nearly 44%) than the literature review indicates is currently the case (25% of
current Medicare beneficiaries). The figures reported in this footnote are not weighted.
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to questions that allowed open-ended estimates of dollar amounts resulted in some
high outliers that skew sample means and inflate standard deviations.158
Table Five: Insurance Premiums Estimates for Respondents in Treatments B and
Treatment C*
N

p10

p25

Median

p75

p90

Mean

SD

Ranges
Suggested in
Anchoring for
Treatment C**

Total Medicare
Premiums

573

$30

$98

$ 120

$250

$500

$211

253

n.a.

Medigap
Premiums

568

$0

$0

$50

$150

$206

$106

173

n.a.

EmployerSponsored
Premiums

566

$0

$0

$55

$200

$450

$149

255

n.a.

Treatment B

Treatment C

Total Medicare
Premiums

562

$50

$100

$135

$200

$350

$259

1019

Medigap
Premiums

229

$25

$50

$100

$185

$250

$135

141

EmployerSponsored
Premiums

342

$0

$80

$165

$200

$330

$300

1579

$96 to $115 for
typical basic
Medicare
premium plus an
average of $40
for typical Part
D Prescription
Drug Coverage
Considerable
variation in
policy types, but
majority of
monthly
Medigap
premiums range
between $50 and
$200
Average
participant costs
for those over 65
roughly $167

* Estimated Requested Only for Respondents Who Indicate Some Possibility of Maintaining Insurance
Coverage at Some Point in Retirement.
** See Appendix for Additional Detail on Anchoring.

Starting with Treatment B respondents, the median expected total premium
estimates were $120 for total Medicare premiums, $50 for Medigap premiums, and
$55 for ESI premiums. Current typical premium costs (shown in the right hand
column of Table Five) for total Medicare costs (basic coverage plus Part D) is
currently $136 to $155, which means median respondents’ estimates were at most a
quarter lower than the typical current premiums. Twenty-five percent of respondents
158
For purposes of this and similar tables below, we have not attempted to eliminate outliers in
the data. See discussion infra note 191.
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thought their total Medicare premiums would be $98 or lower, and a similar number
estimated $250 or higher. Because low-income Medicare beneficiaries can benefit
from premium subsidies through Medicare Savings Programs, described above,159
and higher income beneficiaries pay more on a sliding scale (as much as $250 or
higher), these estimates might reflect a reasonable distribution of estimates—a
possibility that seems plausible based on regression results that show that premium
estimates were positively correlated with income.160 On the other hand, to the extent
responses do not align with likely personal expenses, the accuracy at the median
could communicate the “wisdom of crowds” but might obscure possibly substantial
ranges in either tail of the distribution for individual respondents.161
Treatment C responses, where respondents were prompted with basic
information about actual pricing comparable to the information shown in the right
hand column, were higher than Treatment B responses.162 In all cases, the median
Treatment C estimates of premium costs moved up and closer to levels suggested in
the anchoring information and—perhaps even more pronouncedly—the range of
variation in responses, as measured by high and low percentiles tightened around the
medians in almost all cases. So, for example, where the distance between the tenth
and ninetieth percentiles on the Treatment B responses for total Medicare premiums
was $470, the distance between the same percentiles on the Treatment C responses
was only $300.163 Anchoring information provided to Treatment C respondents had
especially pronounced effects on estimates for Medigap and ESI premiums,
suggesting that public understanding of the costs of these supplemental policies may
be less accurate than the knowledge about Medicare premiums.
Premium estimates also varied by age cohort. Figure One shows distributions of
expectations for total Medicare premiums by age cohorts for respondents from
Treatments B and C. As shown in Figure One, the median response (the lower
number) and ninetieth percentile response (the higher number) both trend downward
with increasing cohort age. Also, the range between the twenty-fifth and the seventyfifth percentile estimates (vertical bar) narrows. This narrowing of ranges with
increasing age is consistent with the greater confidence and knowledge that older
participants have about healthcare costs in retirement as they begin to experience
these costs. The higher median responses of younger cohorts may suggest
expectations that their Medicare premiums are likely to be higher than those of
current retirees, but these higher premium estimates do not translate into higher
expectations of total out-of-pocket cost for younger cohorts, as discussed below.

159

See discussion supra Part II.A.
As discussed below, cost estimates among respondents are positively correlated with income
levels, and this is also true of total Medicare premium estimates, where the median estimate of
respondents in the top income quintile was $250, whereas the median estimate of those in the bottom
quintile was $100. These figures are based on a combination of respondents in Treatments B and C.
161
Note also that mean estimates for these monthly costs skew high, pulled up by a handful of
respondents who tend to “high-ball” their estimates, perhaps reflecting unwillingness or possibly an
inability to respond to our estimation requests.
162
Additional information on our anchoring information is available from the authors.
163
Whether the difference in medians between Treatment B and Treatment C is meaningful for
policy purposes is an interesting question. As noted below, Treatment B and Treatment C estimates
for total out-of-pocket costs were surprisingly similar both to each other and to the estimates of
Treatment A respondents. So however one judges the difference in median estimates about premiums,
those differences largely disappear when respondents were asked to estimate overall costs.
160
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2. Estimates of Total Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
We examined two different approaches to measure out-of-pocket retiree
healthcare costs: average monthly estimates and lump sum estimates. Since much of
our analysis is based on comparisons to expert benchmarks, we begin by explaining
how we compare estimates with benchmarks. When evaluating all responses,
combining all age cohorts, we have chosen to benchmark against expert estimates
for 2020, on the grounds that 2020 approximates the age of retirement of our median
respondent (who is 56.5 years old).164 In analyzing monthly cost estimates, we also
had expert benchmarks for several other future years. Accordingly, in our next layer
of analysis, we divided our age cohorts into four groups (the forty-year olds, the
fifty-year olds, the sixty-year olds, and the seventy-year olds) and compared the
responses for these subsamples to the benchmark that best approximates the
midpoint of the years the average cohort member will be in retirement (2040, 2030,
2020, and 2010, respectively), as described in more detail below. For our lump sum
measures of total costs, we have benchmark estimates only for those retiring in 2020
and 2010, distinguishing male and female costs, and so we evaluated respondent
estimates of lump sum costs using gender-based subsamples and gender-based
benchmarks for 2020. As noted above, in comparing the distribution of our survey
164
One alternative benchmark for these purposes is the 2010 benchmark as the closest reflection
of current costs, and at several points we refer to that alternative benchmark for illustrative purposes,
but it is less appropriate for the typical respondent. Yet another approach would have been to use the
2030 benchmark on the grounds that our average respondent would spend much of retirement in years
beyond 2020 with higher costs. We discuss below how using the 2030 benchmark would affect the
analysis in certain respects but decided on 2020 as the primary benchmark, both because our
benchmarks do not incorporate likely reductions in spending from PPACA (and thus are all arguably
high) and also because, as also discussed above, it is possible that our instruction to estimate spending
in present day dollars might have dissuaded respondents from considering growth in healthcare costs.
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results to these benchmark estimates, we do not mean to suggest that the individual
respondents were correctly estimating where on the distributions their actual
individual healthcare expenditures will fall. Rather, we look at how well the
distribution of our responses aligns with what experts’ estimates suggest is likely to
occur in the overall population. The likely relationship between individual estimates
and actual cost experience is a topic we take up in Section 3 below.
a. Estimating Monthly Out-of-Pocket Costs
Our basic findings with respect to monthly expenditures are presented in Table
Six, which reports average monthly cost estimates for all respondents, followed by
two key subsamples—first age cohorts and then treatment groups.165 In the right
hand column of Table Six, we summarize benchmark ranges discussed earlier.

165
Treatment A respondents were asked a single question about average monthly costs during
retirement and for these respondents we used that single estimate in Table Four and accompanying
figures. Respondents in Treatments B and C were asked to give different monthly estimates for age
sixty-five, seventy-five, and eighty-five. Respondents who were sixty-five or older were first asked
for their current average monthly estimates and then also asked to estimate average monthly expenses
at seventy-five (if they were not yet seventy-five) and eighty-five. For respondents in Treatment B and
C, average monthly costs is the average of estimates of all of their monthly estimates.
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Table Six: Average Monthly Cost Estimates
N

All Respondents

p10

p25

Median

p75

p90

Mean

SD

Benchmark
Ranges from
Literature
Review
2020 Benchmarks:
$204 at 25th
percentile; $274 at
the Median; $413
at the 75th
percentile; and
$606 at the 90th
percentile.

1677

$27

$83

$200

$400

$700

$441

4011

40-44

204

$45

$83

$200

$417

$900

$366

467

45-49

213

$27

$90

$225

$500

$770

$560

2071

50-54

232

$25

$85

$200

$450

$700

$336

474

55-59

247

$43

$100

$225

$467

$700

$927

10213

60-64

255

$20

$92

$200

$400

$700

$299

358

65-69

253

$27

$72

$155

$300

$505

$279

464

70-74

164

$15

$50

$150

$305

$500

$235

356

75-80

109

$35

$98

$217

$350

$600

$291

394

By Age Cohort
2040 Benchmarks:
$383 at 25th
percentile; $518 at
the Median; $788
at the 75th
percentile; and
$1164 at the 90th
percentile.
2030 Benchmarks:
$283 at 25th
percentile; $381 at
the Median; $571
at the 75th
percentile; and
$838 at the 90th
percentile.
2020 Benchmarks:
$204 at 25th
percentile; $274 at
the Median; $413
at the 75th
percentile; and
$606 at the 90th
percentile.
2010 Benchmarks:
$159 at 25th
percentile; $215 at
the Median; $330
at the 75th
percentile; and
$488 at the 90th
percentile.

By Treatment
Treatment A

535

$20

$75

$200

$400

$700

$598

6917

Treatment B

577

$33

$83

$200

$417

$717

$345

467

Treatment C

565

$30

$98

$217

$400

$633

$389

1440

See 2020
Benchmarks Above

i. Monthly Estimates Compared to Benchmarks
Our key finding with respect to these results concerns the relationship of these
estimates to the expert benchmarks. The median monthly estimate of all respondents
was $200, which is not that far beneath the expert benchmark’s estimate of $274 for
the median retiree healthcare costs in 2020. A closer inspection, however, reveals
that our survey responses show something of a bimodal distribution in comparison to
the expert benchmarks. A significant portion of respondent estimates lie above the
expert median and an even larger portion lie well below.166
166

The left hand column of Figure Two A indicates what share of the responses were below the
2020 expert benchmark for the twenty-fifth percentile of expenditures; in the next column the share
that fell between the twenty-fifth percentile and the median; in the next column the share between the
median and the seventy-fifth percentile; in the next column the share between the seventy-fifth
percentile and the ninetieth percentile; and in the final column the share above the ninetieth percentile.
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Figure Two A illustrates this recurring pattern of responses. At the right hand
side of the distribution—reflecting respondents with higher cost estimates—our
survey responses track relatively closely the 2020 expert benchmark estimates of
monthly costs. In Figure Two A, almost a quarter of respondents (24.5%) report
monthly estimates at or above the expert estimate of spending for someone at the
seventy-fifth percentile of retirees, with more than 12% of respondents providing
estimates above the benchmark’s ninetieth percentile. Almost 40% of respondents
had estimates above the benchmark median of $274. The distributions diverge below
the benchmark median. Less than 9% of the respondents had monthly estimates in
the twenty-fifth to fiftieth percentile ranges, which left more than 50% with estimates
beneath the twenty-fifth percentile of the benchmarks. This bimodal distribution of
respondent estimates, as measured against the 2020 benchmark, suggests that while
the median responses of our survey may not fall too substantially beneath the
benchmark medians, many more of our respondents reported monthly cost estimates
in the bottom quartile of the benchmark distributions than would be consistent with
expert views.167

In the unlikely event that our respondents’ estimates perfectly matched this expert benchmark, the
first three columns of the histogram would equal 75% of respondents and the final two columns would
sum to 25% (with 15% in the fourth column and 10% in the fifth).
167
If one were to use the 2010 benchmarks rather than the 2020 benchmarks to make these
comparisons, similar, though somewhat less pronounced results would be produced. With the 2010
benchmark, respondents’ median estimate of $200 was only marginally below the benchmark median
of $215. Slightly over 32% exceeded the seventy-fifth percentile of the 2010 benchmark with 20.4%
above the ninetieth percentile. On the left hand side of the distribution, 41.9% of respondents had
estimates below the twenty-fifth percentile. In short, while our survey responses track more closely
the 2010 benchmarks, the lower end of the survey distribution is still substantially over-represented in
the bottom quartile of the benchmark. Were one to employ the 2030 benchmark, which had a median
estimate of $381, only 14.5% of survey responses were above the seventy-fifth percentile and only
6.2% above the ninetieth percentile. Measured against the 2030 benchmarks, more than 60% of
respondents had estimates beneath the twenty-fifth percentile.
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Because monthly expenses will differ based on when a respondent retires, we
also broke our respondents into four decade-long age groupings and compared
responses against the Johnson and Mommaerts estimates for 2010, 2020, 2030, and
2040, based on the year that best approximates the midpoint of when the cohort’s
members will be in retirement. (See Table Six.) For example, we compared the
answers of respondents in their fifties to the 2030 benchmarks. The respondent in the
midpoint of this grouping would be fifty-five and would retire in 2022 (if he or she
retired at age sixty-five) and live until about 2040. This makes 2030 a rough
midpoint of the respondent’s years in retirement. For similar reasons, we compared
answers from respondents in their forties to the 2040 benchmarks, those in their
sixties to the 2020 benchmarks, and those in their seventies the 2010 benchmarks.
The results are summarized in Figures Two BCDE. While each of the histograms in
this figure has the same basic structure—with the largest share of responses located
in the bottom quartile of the respective benchmark—the combined picture of the
histograms demonstrates that the younger respondents fall further behind their
respective benchmarks than do the older cohorts. So, while 46.3% of seventy-year
old respondents had average monthly estimates in the bottom quartile of the 2010
benchmark, 69.2% of the forty-year olds had responses in the bottom quartile of the
2040 benchmark. Similarly, the number of younger respondents at or above the
benchmark median (as well as the seventy-fifth or ninetieth percentiles) declines
with decreasing age cohorts. While these responses are subject to various
interpretations, including the fact that respondents misunderstood the instruction not
to adjust estimates to reflect overall inflation, younger respondents do not seem to
have been making upward adjustments in their estimates to match the higher
healthcare costs that experts predict. The results thus raise potential concerns that a
significant percentage of those in younger cohorts are underestimating their likely
healthcare spending in retirement.
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ii. Monthly Estimates by Age Cohorts
The distribution of monthly cost estimates across age cohorts, as illustrated in
Figure Two F, offers another perspective on estimates by age cohorts. In contrast to
responses discussed above with respect to future Medicare premiums, the median
respondents in their forties are projecting almost the same average monthly costs as
those just on the eve of retirement, suggesting that younger respondents are not
projecting cost increases (or, alternately, might not understand the implications of
real cost growth in healthcare costs168). While the median estimates of the younger
cohorts are somewhat higher than those of the oldest cohorts, the differences are
relatively small. As the extent of those increases is expected to be substantial, these
responses may suggest an important source of consumer confusion, or at least
misapprehension about likely healthcare costs in retirement. There does, however,
seem to be somewhat greater uncertainty about retiree healthcare expenditures for at
least some of younger cohorts. While the spread between the twenty-fifth and
seventy-fifth percentiles does not widen markedly with the younger cohorts, the
ninetieth percentile responses do, suggesting that at least a fraction of respondents in
the younger cohorts are estimating substantially higher healthcare costs than their
counterparts in the older cohorts.

168

An alternative interpretation is that respondents may have understood our instructions to
express answers in terms of current dollars and not to adjust for general inflation as guidance that they
should avoid any source of increase in out-of-pocket costs, whether from excess medical care cost
growth or the reduction of government insurance programs. In this case, our responses might reflect
confusion regarding general inflation versus other economic or cost growth.
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iii. Other Features of Monthly Estimates
In contrast with the premium estimates discussed above, respondent estimates
are relatively stable across treatment groups. As reported in Table Six, while
Treatment C responses showed a modest narrowing in distribution similar to the
narrowing noted above for their estimates of premiums, the treatment groups
provided similar estimates, regardless of whether they were posed as simple
questions about out-of-pocket costs in Treatment A or given a good deal of
additional framing and anchoring in Treatments B and C. Median responses did not
differ greatly across treatments.
Our survey questions on monthly cost estimates also included two extensions
that explored the extent to which respondents expected their monthly costs to vary
over the course of retirement. First, we asked all respondents to make separate
monthly cost estimates for the last year of their lives. Respondents overwhelmingly
estimated that they would have higher monthly costs in their final year.169 The
median estimate was $350 as compared with a median estimate for average monthly
costs of $200 for all respondents. We also calculated the ratio of individual
responses on this question to their average monthly cost estimates and determined
that the median ratio was 1.46 or nearly 50% higher than the average monthly cost
estimate. This is similar to, though not as extreme as, estimates based on expert data
of a ratio of two, or nearly 100% higher.170
For respondents in Treatments B and C, we also compared individual
respondent estimates of monthly costs at age eighty-five as opposed to monthly costs
at age sixty-five to gauge their understanding of how costs are likely to change
toward the end of their lives. While one quarter of respondents projected monthly
costs at eighty-five at or below levels at age sixty-five, the median response
indicated a projected increase of 33%, which is in line with the ratio of cost
increases reported above in our literature review for costs experienced by the
average member of an eighty-five-year old cohort, as compared to the average
member of a sixty-five-year old cohort.171 So, again on this dimension, the typical
response was consistent with expert views. These results—in conjunction with the
findings on overall monthly estimates above—suggest that at least some people do
have some understanding of future healthcare expenditures, more so than we
hypothesized we would find.
b. Lump Sum Estimates
As an alternative measure of retiree healthcare costs, we asked all respondents
to estimate the amount of money that a person similar to the respondent would need
to accumulate by the age of sixty-five in order to save enough money to pay for their
total expected out-of-pocket costs for healthcare in retirement.172 Our goal here was
169
There is a risk of demand effect, namely that inquiring about last year costs suggests that such
costs will be higher. Even if demand effect is occurring here, it is nonetheless interesting that the
magnitude of estimates is close to experts’ estimates and that, when prompted, people intuit higher
costs in their final year.
170
This expert ratio is calculated based on the estimate in the Marshall study of the median last
year of life ($5061) divided by the overall median annual estimate in the Johnson and Mommaerts
study ($2583). Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 37; see also JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6,
at 11.
171
A comparable increase of 33% can be seen in the median estimates from the Hurd &
Rohwedder study of $720 for a sixty-five to sixty-nine year old and $950 for an over eighty-five year
old. See Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66.
172
The actual question read as follows:
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to solicit savings targets that the respondents would associate with the amount
needed on the eve of retirement to cover expected healthcare costs in retirement.173
Many different factors could affect an estimate of lifetime spending: estimates
of monthly spending, projections of life expectancy, and ability to toggle between
monthly and lifetime estimates, considering real cost growth. Even if a respondent
estimates monthly spending well, she might underestimate her life expectancy and
the number of years of future spending. Further, recent financial literacy research
illustrates that people have difficulty translating between periodic and lump sum
payments, suggesting that our respondents might similarly struggle.174 Accordingly,
in designing our survey, we hypothesized that respondents’ estimates of lump sum
costs might be significantly further from expert views than their monthly cost
estimates. As described below, while the lump sum responses were lower than
monthly estimates compared to expert benchmarks, the overall structure of lump
sum responses—and the bimodal distribution identified above—were similar to the
responses for monthly costs
Survey responses on lump sum estimates are reported in Table Seven with
results for all respondents on the top line, followed by responses broken out by age
cohort and then treatment. The median lump sum estimate for all respondents was
$50,000, with the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles of responses ranging
from $10,000 to $150,000.

“In planning for retirement, some individuals like to think in terms of how much money
they would need to save by the time they turn 65 in order to have enough money to
cover out-of-pocket costs in retirement. Imagine that you were asked to give advice to
someone with similar preferences and health characteristics as your own. If such a
person wanted to have enough money to cover a reasonable estimate of their total outof-pocket costs for health care in retirement, how much do you think they would need to
have set aside? Please give your answer in terms of the total amount of dollars needed at
age 65.”
173
It is possible—as one reader noted—that respondents could interpret this question to mean
how much they would need to have saved to avoid bankruptcy or significant retirement risk, rather
than to cover all out-of-pocket costs. In this case, retirees’ estimates would be lower than their
expectations of total costs, in which case their expectations of total costs would be even closer to
experts’ estimates than we report herein.
174
See generally Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Framing and Claiming: How Information-Framing
Affects Expected Social Security Claiming Behavior (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 17018, 2011) (showing that individuals’ choices on when to claim Social Security benefits, from
ages sixty-two to seventy, vary based on how this claiming decision is framed); Jeffrey R. Brown, et
al., Do Consumers Know How to Value Annuities? Complexity as a Barrier to Annuitization (June 7,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (showing difficulty among survey respondents
in valuing annuities).
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Table Seven: Lump Sum Estimates
N

p10

p25

Median

p75

p90

Mean

SD

1660

$500

$10,000

$50,000

$150,000

$500,000

$1,384,054

49,818,364

40-44

201

$1,200

$10,000

$50,000

$150,000

$600,000

$262,927

1,156,264

45-49

211

$900

$5,000

$35,000

$200,000

$750,000

$659,895

6,283,426

50-54

229

$600

$7,000

$45,000

$150,000

$500,000

$233,590

787,712

55-59

246

$500

$10,000

$50,000

$150,000

$500,000

$6,907,215

60-64

253

$300

$5,000

$50,000

$150,000

$400,000

$224,266

1,264,231

65-69

250

$350

$7,500

$30,000

$150,000

$425,000

$169,440

579,634

70-74

163

$200

$10,000

$50,000

$150,000

$500,000

$1,543,706

13,883,700

75-80

107

$50

$5,000

$50,000

$150,000

$500,000

$135,410

267,179

Treatment A

531

$650

$10,000

$50,000

$200,000

$500,000

$3,489,643

87,689,268

Treatment B

568

$500

$10,000

$45,000

$150,000

$500,000

$294,073

3,122,465

Treatment C

561

$500

$7,000

$50,000

$150,000

$500,000

$493,404

6,339,326

All
Respondents

By Age Cohort

129,215,115

Suggested Ranges
from Literature
Review

2020 Benchmarks
for Men: $109,000 at
the Median;
$198,000 at the 75th
percentile; and
$313,000 at the 90th
percentile.

2020 Benchmarks
for Women:
$156,000 at the
Median; $230,000 at
the 75th percentile;
and $357,000 at the
90th percentile.
2010 Benchmarks
for Men: $65,000 at
the Median;
$118,000 at the 75th
percentile; and
$187,000 at the 90th
percentile.

By Treatment
2010 Benchmarks
for Women: $93,000
at the Median;
$137,000 at the 75th
percentile; and
$213,000 at the 90th
percentile.

i. Lump Sum Estimates Compared to Benchmarks
Our comparison of respondent estimates with expert estimates again center on
2020 benchmarks. As these benchmarks vary by gender, we distinguish between
projected spending for male and female respondents. Figures Three A-B presents
histograms of responses for male and female subsamples against their respective
2020 benchmarks. Our benchmark EBRI study does not include a twenty-fifth
percentile estimate, so the left hand column of these figures reports the share of
responses beneath the benchmark median. As with the comparable histograms for
average monthly costs, Figures Three A-B shows that responses from both men and
women again produced a bimodal distribution with a healthy share of respondents
making lump sum estimates above the seventy-fifth percentile of the relevant
benchmark (28.0% for men and 17.7% for women) and a disproportionate share of
both subsamples reporting responses beneath the benchmark median (65.2% for men
and 79.5% for women). While the general structure of these histograms is similar to
analogous charts for average monthly cost estimates,175 the women’s responses fall
175
The absence of a twenty-fifth percentile benchmark for lump sum estimates makes it harder to
identify the extent to which our lump sum responses gravitate to the left hand side benchmark
distributions. However, for our full sample as well as both male and female subsamples, the twentyfifth percentile response was $10,000, very far below median lump sum benchmarks for either men
($109,000) or women ($156,000). Thus, it appears quite likely that our lump sum responses were also
skewed to lower end estimates.
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further beneath benchmark metrics than the men’s do. This is particularly true if one
focuses on median responses. Whereas the men’s median response of $60,000 is
over 50% of the benchmark median for men of $109,000, the women’s median
response of $30,000 is less than a fifth of the benchmark median of $156,000 for
women.176 We discuss this gender differential in more depth in Section 3 below.

ii. Lump Sum Estimates by Age Cohorts
Results broken down by age cohort were also reminiscent of those we obtained
for estimates of average monthly costs: The median responses of all age cohorts
were at or close to $50,000, and the distance between the twenty-fifth and seventyfifth percentile responses was also highly consistent across age cohorts, although the
ninetieth percentile responses did tend to drift upward for younger cohorts, again
suggesting greater uncertainty about future costs. See Figure Three C. On average,
the younger cohorts seemed to be making lump sum estimates quite similar to those
of older cohorts on the eve of retirement or in retirement.177

176

One sees similar differentials if survey lump sum responses are measured against the 2010
benchmarks. The 2010 benchmark median for women is $93,000, which is almost three times our
actual median female estimate of $30,000, whereas the 2010 benchmark median for men is $65,000,
which is actually quite close to the median male estimate of our respondents: $60,000.
177
As noted below, respondents did slightly underestimate the likelihood that they would survive
to ages sixty-five and seventy-five, when compared with expert assessments, which could explain one
of the reasons why respondents’ lump sum estimates fall a bit further beneath expert estimates than
was the case with respondents’ average monthly cost estimates.
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Interpreting responses of younger cohorts on these lump sum questions is
difficult. Some respondents might have interpreted the question to solicit estimates
of savings targets for someone reaching sixty-five today in which case adjustment
for future real increases in healthcare costs would not have been appropriate.178 It is
also possible that respondents had difficulty in making adjustments to savings
targets to reflect real increases in future healthcare costs. In this case, it is troubling
that younger cohorts generally did not project high savings targets, especially if
these projections influence retirement planning for individuals several decades away
from retirement.179 While there are undoubtedly complexities in interpreting
responses of younger cohorts with respect to these savings targets, the fact that
younger respondents did not estimate materially higher savings needs than older
cohorts strikes us as a potentially important finding and worthy of further study.180
iii. Implied Lump Sum Estimates
One of the hypotheses that we wanted to explore with our lump sum estimates
was whether respondents might do a relatively good job estimating monthly costs
but then make some sort of systematic error in mental math that led them to make
unreasonably low lump sum estimates. Such a cognitive error would be significant
because it could lead individuals to set their targeted savings for retirement
178

For the wording of our survey question, see supra note 172.
One hypothesis suggested by a workshop participant is these responses reflect an expectation
of younger respondents that political forces will not allow out-of-pocket costs to increase above
$50,000 in current dollars. Under this view, respondents collectively might have a more accurate view
of future out-of-pocket costs than experts focusing primarily on past trends and without accounting for
political constraints.
180
Conclusions with respect to younger cohort responses are probably best drawn from a
complete review of survey response. We attempt such a summary in the conclusion of this paper.
179
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healthcare spending at too low levels, even if they did a relatively good job at
estimating what their average monthly expenditures for retiree healthcare might be.
To some degree, such errors may have occurred as the lump sum estimates reported
above do fall further from expert benchmarks than did respondents’ monthly cost
estimates.
To explore whether this reduction in lump sum estimates might be the product
of errors in respondents’ expectations regarding their own life expectancies, we
asked all respondents a series of questions about their own assessment of their life
expectancies.181 In reviewing responses to these questions, we found that
respondents’ estimates were reasonably close to SSA projections on life expectancy.
Our median respondents reported an 80% likelihood of living past sixty-five, a 70%
likelihood of living past seventy-five, a 50% likelihood of living past eighty-five,
and a 10% likelihood of living past ninety-five. These responses underestimate the
likelihood of surviving to sixty-five and seventy-five (which Social Security
actuaries currently put at approximately 92% and 75%) by 10% to 15%, but
somewhat overestimate the likelihood of living beyond eighty-five (which Social
Security actuaries estimate in the range of 43%).182 Thus, it does not appear that our
respondents were systemically underestimating their life expectancies in a material
way.
We further analyzed the relationship between respondents’ monthly cost
estimates and their lump sum estimates by generating for each respondent an
“implied lump sum estimate,” based on the monthly cost estimates that each
respondent provided, his or her final year monthly cost estimates, and his or her
reported self-assessed life expectancy. Using this information, we projected an
expected cost cash flow for the person and then discounted that cash flow back to a
valuation at age sixty-five, which represents the amount of money the person would
need to exactly cover his or her self-reported expected monthly costs. We made
these calculations using several different discount rates; the results reported here
employ a 1.5% real discount rate.183
Rather than excessively discounting their lump sum estimates, respondents
appear to have modestly adjusted upward their lump sum estimates as compared to
implied lump sum estimates. The implied lump sum estimates, at least as we
181
Framing of the questions of life expectancy can have an effect on responses, as reported in a
recent study in John W. Payne et al., Life Expectancy as a Constructed Belief: Evidence of a Live-to
or Die-by Framing Effect (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research, Paper No. 12-10, 2012). Questions framed
as the probability of “living to” a particular age generate higher average estimates than those framed
in terms of “dying by” that same age. Id. at 5. When compared with estimates of life expectancy,
based on SSA data and adjusted to each respondent’s age and gender, the “living to” frame produced
subjective estimates closer to the actual estimates than the “dying by” frame at ages sixty-five and
seventy-five, equally accurate at eighty-five, and less accurate at ninety-five, when both frames lead
to overly optimistic responses. Id. at 9 fig. 3a.. For purposes of our survey, we adopted a “living to”
frame to survey respondents’ anticipated life expectancy.
182
See Actuarial Life Table, supra note 101. Our median responses for surviving past ninety-five
closely match expert views (9%). Respondents were directionally accurate in reporting longer life
expectancies for women than for men.
183
As respondents were instructed to estimate future monthly costs in terms of current dollars, a
real (as opposed to nominal) discount rate was employed. As a robustness check, we recalculated
respondents’ implied lump sums using both a 3.0% and a 0% discount rates. With the 3.0 % discount
rate, median response for cohorts range between $35,000 and $45,000 with an overall median of about
$10,000 lower than actual lump sum estimates. With a 0% discount rate, the median response for
cohorts ranged from $45,000 to $75,000 with an overall median about $8000 higher than actual lump
sum estimates. These results crudely suggest that respondents may be using a mental discount rate
closer to 1.5%.
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calculated them, were about 6% lower than respondents’ actual lump sum estimates
taken as a group ($47,000 median implied lump sum, as compared to $50,000
median actual estimated lump sum). Conceivably, respondents may have been
adding a modest cushion of additional savings to make sure they would have enough
for unanticipated costs. While these results are sensitive to our assumed discount
rate, the results do not suggest significant downward errors in lump sum calculations
as compared with monthly costs adjusted for self-reported life expectancies.184

In fact, we see some evidence of erroneous inflation of lump sum estimates
when looking at the distribution of implied lump sum estimates by age cohort, as
shown in Figure Four. The distribution of percentiles is much narrower in this figure
than in the comparable figure (Figure Three C) for actual lump sum estimates. In
particular, the ninetieth percentile estimates of the implied lump sum calculations are
much lower. (In Figure Four, we have superimposed circles indicating the ninetieth
percentiles for actual lump sum estimates from Figure Three C and boxes to reflect
the seventy-fifth percentile estimates.) For example, the ninetieth percentile estimate
of implied lump sums for the forty-five to forty-nine year old age cohort is about
$180,000 whereas the comparable ninetieth percentile actual lump sum estimate is
$750,000. In other words, far from excessively discounting their lump sum
estimates, our respondents in many cases were offering lump sum estimates that
were substantially higher than the savings levels actually needed to match their own
estimated monthly costs and self-assessed life expectancies.185 A substantial number
184

Even with a 0% discount rate, the median implied lump sum estimate was just under $58,000.
The upper range of actual lump sum estimates exceed implied lump sum estimates even when
calculated using a 0% discount rate. So, for example, the ninetieth percentile implied lump sum of the
forty-five to forty-nine age cohort calculated with a 0% discount rate is roughly $225,000 compared
with the $750,000 ninetieth percentile estimate for actual lump sum for that age cohort.
185
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of respondents appear to have been engaging in mental math that suggested an
unobtainably high savings target, rather than engaging in mental math that set
unrealistically low savings needs. Such high targets could create a barrier to saving
due to a sense of futility, as discussed further below.
iv. Other Notable Features of Lump Sum Estimates
As reported in Table Seven above, lump sum estimates showed extremely
modest variation across treatments, with all three treatments having a median
estimate of approximately $50,000 and only a modest narrowing of distributions
from Treatment A to the other two treatments. So, as was true of monthly cost
estimates, framing and anchoring had negligible effects on responses.
3. Estimates and Demographic Spending Variation
One of the complexities in interpreting respondents’ answers is uncertainty
about whether those reporting low or high estimated costs are, in fact, individuals
who will actually incur below or above median healthcare costs in retirement. To
tease out this question, we segmented our sample into a series of subgroups based on
income, gender, self-reported health status, and financial sophistication (based on
self-reported information on financial planning and familiarity with budgeting and
healthcare insurance, as well as self-reported consultations with financial planners).
We then analyzed whether this partitioning of the data produced differences in
average monthly cost estimates or actual lump sum estimates that were consistent
with expert evaluations of the relationships between these categories and out-ofpocket retiree healthcare costs. The results, which are summarized in Table Eight for
average monthly costs, are mixed. 186

186
We focus here on findings that the regression analysis, discussed below, suggests are
significant. Monthly estimates increased with higher levels of self-reported health status of
respondents, as reported in Table Eight, but the regression analysis below suggests this effect may
simply reflect interactions with income or education level.
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Table Eight: Average Monthly Cost Estimates by Gender, Health Status,
Income Quintiles and Financial Sophistication
N

p10

p25

Median

p75

p90

Mean

SD

345
432
263
447
187

$0
$35
$43
$50
$100

$30
$83
$100
$125
$200

$100
$200
$250
$283
$350

$200
$350
$450
$500
$633

$392
$600
$700
$750
$1,005

$455
$503
$341
$392
$525

5267
6240
371
540
542

729
948

$25
$30

$90
$80

$217
$190

$467
$361

$758
$600

$436
$445

1268
5431

$40
$40
$33
$10
$0

$100
$100
$90
$45
$33

$300
$220
$200
$150
$150

$500
$400
$400
$361
$417

$1,000
$667
$658
$650
$767

$451
$619
$324
$291
$353

664
6536
485
431
618

$667
$700
$700

$572
$427
$308

6584
1455
427

$650
$667
$700

$474
$417
$430

5538
1605
3628

$800
$600
$500

$474
$417
$430

5538
1605
3628

By Income Quintile
Quintile 1
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Quintile 5
By Gender
Male
Female

By Health Status (self reported)
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Fair
Poor

151
646
601
222
56

By Self-Assessed Familiarity with Government Programs and Insurance Plans
Low Familiarity
Medium
High Familiarity

545
507
625

$23
$45
$20

$83
$100
$75

$200
$200
$200

$417
$413
$392

By Self-Assessed Attention to Monthly Healthcare Costs and Other Expenses
Low Familiarity
Medium
High Familiarity

511
412
754

$20
$40
$35

$50
$100
$100

$167
$217
$210

$375
$400
$433

By Self-Reported Consultations with Financial Planner About Retirement
Yes
No
Don’t Know

578
1074
25

$50
$20
$50

$140
$67
$150

$300
$175
$233

$517
$350
$300

Variations by income levels tracked expert evaluations. As discussed above,
higher income individuals tend to pay more for retiree healthcare and also live
longer, thereby increasing overall retiree healthcare costs. Our survey respondents
seemed to be quite attuned to this effect. So, as reported in Table Eight, the median
expected monthly cost of the lowest quintile respondents was just $100, whereas the
median response for the highest quintile of respondents was $350. As shown in
Figure Five, this differential was even more pronounced with respect to lump sum
estimates where median estimates of the lowest income quintile were $10,000, as
compared to $125,000 for the highest quintile. In terms of the effect of income on
retiree healthcare costs, respondents’ intuitions were directionally aligned with
expert views, even if perhaps showing a stronger effect than experts might suggest is
likely.187

187
Wealthier respondents also gave higher estimates of total Medicare premiums. See supra
notes 95-99.
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We observed the opposite with regard to gender. As a result of having longer
life expectancies and more expensive supplemental coverage, a typical woman
retiring in 2010 has 40% higher expected out-of-pocket healthcare costs in
retirement than a typical man188 and higher expected annual costs.189 Nevertheless,
as reported in the second section of Table Eight, women largely estimated lower
average monthly costs than men with a median estimate of $190 for women as
compared to $217 for men. This difference was even more pronounced for lump sum
estimates, where women’s median estimate was $30,000 versus $60,000 for men.
Thus, women underestimated average monthly healthcare costs as compared to men
and compounded that underestimation in producing lump sum estimates, making
their actual reported median estimates substantially below the benchmark median
estimates for women, as drawn from our literature review.
Finally, we explored whether self-reported financial sophistication might be
correlated with survey responses. We asked all respondents three questions to gauge
financial sophistication. The most pronounced effect on monthly estimates came
from our third question on financial sophistication: whether respondents had
consulted with a financial planner about retirement.190 The median estimate among
respondents who reported a consultation with a financial planner was $300, as
compared to $175 for respondents who said they had not. While one must treat selfreported responses of this sort with caution, these results do raise the possibility that
188

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103.
Responses to questions regarding familiarity with government programs and the level of
attention they pay to monthly healthcare costs and other expenses showed little or no effect on
estimates. Although familiarity does not appear to be strongly associated with differences in
respondent estimates, older respondents reported a much higher degree of familiarity on these
dimensions than did younger respondents.
189
190
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personal interventions with respect to retiree healthcare costs may be effective in
raising individual estimates of retiree healthcare costs.
In an effort to explore the interactions between these various correlates and
respondents’ estimates, we conducted a series of regression analyses. Table Nine A
reports summary results for four rudimentary models examining the correlates of
monthly cost responses. The first three columns of Table Nine A are quantile
regressions (at the twenty-fifth percentile, median, and seventy-fifth percentile) and
the fourth column is a trimmed Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) log formulation.191
For each regression, we included gender, a dummy for age cohorts younger than
fifty-five, income quintiles, health status, educational achievement, and a dummy
representing consultations with financial planners as independent variables. While
explaining only a small fraction of overall variation in monthly costs, all four models
show consistent, statistically significant coefficients for the dummy for younger
cohorts, income quintiles, educational attainment, and the financial planner dummy,
suggesting that all of these variables are correlated with estimates of monthly costs.
The coefficients for these variables also were intuitively coherent, with higher
income quartiles having larger coefficients than lower income quartiles, and the
magnitude of the coefficients for the financial planner dummy and educational
attainment increasing for higher percentile regressions. The models also suggest that,
once other factors are controlled for, respondents from younger cohorts do offer
somewhat higher estimates of monthly costs than do the older cohorts, although the
magnitude of those differences (on the range of $17 to $82 in the quantile
regressions) do not equal the projected increases in future health costs that experts
predict.192 While the female dummy has a negative coefficient in two of the models,
in only one model is the coefficient statistically significant, casting some doubt on
earlier results suggesting that women were making lower estimates across the board
for monthly costs than men (once controls for educational attainment and household
income are included).

191
We utilized these functional forms to limit the influence of outliers on the analysis. As noted
earlier, some respondent estimates—especially with respect to lump sum estimates—seemed
unreasonably high, suggesting that perhaps some responses may have been protest bids in response to
inherently difficult questions or for some other reason providing implausible answers. In prior
sections of our analysis we have relied on median and percentile analysis to limit the impact of these
outliers. As compared to traditional OLS regression, quantile regressions serve a similar function. The
log form of the fourth model also reduces the influence of outliers as does our trimming of the top 1%
of observations, which eliminates survey responses with average monthly costs over roughly $2500.
192
When we segmented the sample into male and female subsamples and re-ran our regressions,
the coefficient for the younger cohort variables remained statistically significant for only the male
subsample, suggesting that men were driving the higher cost estimates from younger cohorts reported
in the text.
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Table Nine A: Examining the Correlates of Average Monthly Cost
Estimates with Quantile Regressions and Trimmed and Log OLS
(1)
25th Percentile

(2)
Median

(3)
75th Percentile

(4)
Log OLS
Trimmed

Female

3.556
(7.876)

-13.077
(13.271)

-61.248***
(21.524)

-0.016
(0.079)

Younger Three
Age Cohorts

17.685**
(8.083)

36.154***
(13.621)

82.438***
(22.091)

0.172**
(0.082)

Second Income
Quintile

44.333***
(12.780)

74.359***
(21.535)

148.657***
(34.926)

0.879***
(0.139)

Third Income
Quintile

53.333***
(12.139)

89.744***
(20.455)

169.752***
(33.175)

1.053***
(0.156)

Fourth Income
Quintile

80.796***
(13.583)

115.641***
(22.889)

208.905***
(37.122)

1.081***
(0.157)

Fifth Income
Quintile

104.370***
(13.420)

177.949***
(22.613)

253.286***
(36.675)

1.410***
(0.156)

Health Status

4.056
(4.395)

12.821*
(7.406)

12.886
(12.012)

-0.034
(0.056)

Educational
Attainment

6.519***
(1.967)

8.205**
(3.315)

12.686**
(5.376)

0.027
(0.022)

Consultation with
Financial Planner

31.611***
(8.788)

64.359***
(14.807)

116.914***
(24.015)

0.276***
(0.078)

Constant

-57.796**
(28.104)

-23.333
(47.357)

29.962
(76.805)

3.821***
(0.303)

Observations

1673

1673

1673

1654

Adjusted
R2/Pseudo R2

0.026

0.031

0.032

0.143

F
18.447
Standard errors in parentheses
Models One to Three utilize Quantile Regressions to estimate the coefficients; Model Four utilizes OLS.
Quantile Regressions utilize unweighted data.
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table Nine B presents similar regressions for lump sum estimates.193 While
most of the results were similar to those for average monthly cost estimates, the
female dummy did, however, behave differently in the lump sum regressions, with
consistently negative coefficients in all four regressions and statistically significant
coefficients for three quantile regressions. So, negative effects of gender on cost
estimates identified early seem to reemerge with these lump sum regressions,
suggesting that women’s estimates are more likely to fall short of men’s when
dealing with lifetime costs as opposed to monthly budgets. The financial planner
dummy was again consistently significant in all models. The coefficients for income
quintiles and younger cohorts were not as consistently statistically significant as
193
Trimming of the top 1% of lump sum estimates eliminated responses with estimates in excess
of $3.0 million on the fourth model.
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with the monthly cost regressions, but they still retained the same basic structure as
the analogous coefficients in the monthly cost regressions.
Table Nine B: Examining the Correlates of Lump Sum Estimates with Quantile
Regressions and Trimmed Log OLS
(1)
25th Percentile

(2)
Median

(3)
75th Percentile

(4)
Log OLS
Trimmed

-10007.407***
(2602.090)

-14545.455*
(7534.554)

-49946.667***
(16920.906)

-0.094
(0.177)

Younger Three
Age Cohorts

3709.259
(2673.710)

7272.727
(7741.934)

57005.714***
(17386.635)

0.199
(0.172)

Second Income
Quintile

157.407
(4231.914)

8181.818
(12253.835)

64171.429**
(27519.343)

0.903***
(0.280)

Third Income
Quintile

7261.111*
(4012.512)

34090.909***
(11618.539)

78556.190***
(26092.613)

1.443***
(0.358)

Fourth Income
Quintile

5000.000
(4494.106)

32727.273**
(13013.032)

149893.333***
(29224.329)

1.612***
(0.285)

Fifth Income
Quintile

28231.481***
(4425.940)

66363.636***
(12815.652)

214144.762***
(28781.058)

1.682***
(0.366)

Health Status

-2261.111
(1452.695)

3636.364
(4206.390)

14251.429
(9446.601)

-0.055
(0.111)

Educational
Attainment

-485.185
(651.335)

4090.909**
(1885.991)

7139.048*
(4235.510)

0.183***
(0.043)

Consultation with
Financial Planner

11842.593***
(2900.927)

35454.545***
(8399.860)

57192.381***
(18864.187)

0.529***
(0.177)

Constant

18896.296**
(9302.138)

-26818.182
(26935.062)

-49786.667
(60490.062)

7.004***
(0.612)

Observations

1656

1656

1656

1637

Adjusted
R2/Pseudo R2

0.001

0.003

0.004

0.123

Female

F
16.914
Standard errors in parentheses
Models One to Three utilize Quantile Regressions to estimate the coefficients; Model Four utilizes OLS.
Quantile Regressions utilize unweighted data.
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

The regression models presented in the preceding tables should be viewed with
some caution. To begin, survey responses on cost estimates are difficult to model as
they skew towards higher numbers with a fairly large number of outliers. While
quantile regressions, trimming, and log transformations of dependent variables are
all designed to mitigate those complexities, these adjustments may not offer
complete solutions. In addition, the explanatory power of the models is limited, with
quite low adjusted R-Squares and Pseudo R-Squares in all cases. That said, the
correlations with income, use of financial planners, and educational achievement
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seem reasonably robust.194 Our survey responses, taken as a whole, did reflect the
reality that wealthier respondents will likely spend more on healthcare costs in
retirement as a result of a combination of progressive insurance premiums, higher
consumption of healthcare services by the more affluent, and greater longevity. The
strong performance of the financial planner dummy suggests that this kind of
financial education may be associated with higher estimates of retiree healthcare
costs, although causation here is unclear. While the negative correlation between the
female dummy and cost estimates was not robust across all our regressions, the
negative coefficients on female lump sum estimates were often statistically
significant, and we certainly did not find any evidence that women were estimating
higher healthcare costs than men, as experts suggest they should. On balance, our
results suggest the possibility that women may well fail to appreciate that they face
higher healthcare costs in retirement and, indeed, may be systemically
underestimating costs as compared to men, at least with respect to their lump sum
estimates.

C. ESTIMATING UNCERTAINTY: HEALTH, MEDICAL INFLATION, POLICY CHANGE
In the final module of our survey, we divided all respondents into two separate
groups and asked each group a series of questions designed to elicit their assessment
of three sources of potential risk for out-of-pocket healthcare expenses in retirement:
variation in individual health experience, unanticipated medical cost growth, and
changes in government policies with respect to Medicare and other government
programs. As discussed earlier in our literature review, all three of the risks could be
material. Variations in individual health experience could double to triple individual
out-of-pocket costs above median levels, and government policy changes could as
much as double them. Respondents across the board did not identify individual
health and policy changes as the most salient risks, nor did they appreciate the extent
to which these risks could increase their out-of-pocket spending for healthcare in
retirement. Thus, we found that while respondents’ understanding of typical out-ofpocket spending is variable, their understanding of uncertainty is pervasively low.
1. Group One: Assessments of Concern and Severity
For half of our respondents, we asked them to make a qualitative assessment of
the risk that each form of uncertainty poses to future spending. First, we asked
respondents in this group to evaluate on a four-point scale how concerned they were
about each of the risks. Second, we asked them if the risk should materialize, how
much more they would need to budget for out-of-pocket healthcare costs if they
wanted to be “highly confident” of having sufficient resources to cover the costs.
In this formulation, respondents seemed to identify policy changes and medical
inflation as being the greater sources of risk, but they underestimated the potential
magnitude of both. In terms of level of concern, summarized in Figure Six, these two
risks dominated across age cohorts. Again, this response is inconsistent with expert
perceptions of the relative risk, which would clearly rank variations in individual
194

In other regression runs not reported here, we found the relationship between respondents’
estimates and expectations regarding health insurance coverage were generally consistent with expert
estimates of the relationship between supplemental coverage and total out-of-pocket costs. For
example, respondents reporting higher expectations of having Medicaid coverage made lower
estimates of out of pocket costs, while those expecting Medigap coverage estimated higher spending.
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health experience, and probably also policy uncertainty, as a more significant risk
than unanticipated medical inflation, especially for those at or near retirement for
whom any inflation will have limited impact.

On the issue of how large of a financial impact respondents estimated that the
risks could pose to their budgets, nearly all respondents underestimate the magnitude
of these risks, especially with regard to individual health experience risk. Figure
Seven reports responses for Individual Health Experience (on the left) and Policy
Changes (on the right). For example, only a fifth of all respondents estimated that
adverse individual health experience could lead to a more than 50% increase in outof-pocket costs, although expert opinion suggests those who end up in the seventyfifth or ninetieth percentile of out-of-pocket costs are likely to spend double to triple
that of someone at the median.195 Similarly, less than a third of respondents reported
that they would need at least 50% more in financial resources to compensate for
adverse changes in government policy, even though expert views are that some
current reform proposals for Medicare could have a much larger effect.196

195

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text. It is possible that our respondents chose a middle
option out of the five multiple choice responses. Nonetheless, such random selection would suggest
ignorance. Furthermore, answers with regard to individual health experience were skewed more
toward the second choice and policy uncertainty toward the third, which confirms less concern with
individual health experience than with policy uncertainty.
196
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2. Group Two: Willingness to Pay
To gain an alternative perspective on the topic of risk, we posed questions to the
other half in terms of their willingness to pay to be free of each of these specific
risks.197 As reported in Table Ten, the median respondent was willing to pay a
monthly insurance premium of about $150 to be relieved from the risk of higher outof-pocket costs from individual health experience. While it is difficult to know if
this specific estimate is actuarially sound, what is most interesting is that the
willingness to pay responses for each of these three questions were roughly similar.
While the medians for responses on willingness to pay for protection against medical
inflation and willingness to pay for protection against policy changes were a bit
lower ($125 and $120, respectively) than the health experience analog ($150), the
distributions were roughly comparable. Certainly, there is no indication in this data
that respondents overall were especially concerned about individual health
experience or policy changes; indeed the latter had the lowest median and
distribution ranges of the three.198 Nor was there strong evidence in our results that
younger workers were particularly wary about risking healthcare costs. Responses to
the other two willingness to pay questions suggest that younger respondents placed a
197
An illustrative question here read as follows: “Research suggests that health care expenses in
retirement can vary considerably from individual to individual based on differences in the health of
individuals and their medical needs. As a result, out-of-pocket costs for some individuals can be much
higher than those of the average retiree. How much would you be willing to pay each month for an
insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring out-of-pocket costs higher than those of the
average retiree, regardless of your own health or medical needs?”
198
The cohort on the eve of retirement, ages sixty to sixty-four, did, however, skew somewhat
higher at the top end of the distribution in their willingness to pay for insurance against policy
changes and against high individual healthcare costs.
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higher value on protection against bad individual health experience and policy
changes than did older respondents, but even there the trends were not especially
strong. Thus, our primary takeaway from this inquiry into risk assessment is that
respondents did not sharply distinguish across type of risks nor were younger
workers markedly more concerned about unanticipated inflation or even policy
changes than older respondents.
Table Ten: Willingness to Pay for Protection Against Three Risks
Protection Against High
Costs from Individual
Health Experience
Protection Against
High Costs Unanticipated
Inflation in Medical
Costs
Protection Against High
Costs form Adverse
Policy Changes

N

p10

p25

Median

p75

p90

Mean

SD

834

$30

$75

$150

$300

$600

$574

4510.7

833

$20

$50

$125

$250

$500

$341

1364.6

833

$10

$50

$120

$250

$500

$442

3434.2

To be sure, there are considerable complexities in interpreting individual
assessments of financial risks, but the responses to this module of our survey suggest
to us that our respondents had difficulty distinguishing among sources of risk and
may in some areas substantially underestimate the extent of the potential risk, in
particular with regard to their own individual health experiences.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article offers a starting point for investigation of the timely and important
issue of Americans’ expectations about their likely out-of-pocket healthcare
expenditures in retirement. The evolving structure of healthcare benefits and
regulation aims to promote greater individual autonomy and decision-making and
rests on the assumption that individuals can make good decisions. Our analysis
suggests places where lack of knowledge could impede sound decision-making. In
Part A of this final section, we discuss key takeaways from our research. In Part B,
we consider ways to increase financial security for retirees through improved
financial planning and greater insurance protection.
A. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Point One: Quality of Overall Estimates and Demographic Variation
a. Overall Estimates
One unexpected insight from this study was identifying instances in which many
respondents’ answers were similar to expert estimates. Many respondents’ estimates
of likely out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures in retirement accord with expert
estimates of likely spending. A substantial fraction of respondents offered estimates
of out-of-pocket expenditures in retirement that were at or above median expert
estimates. This was true for both estimates of average monthly expenses and for
lump sum estimates. In many instances, a quarter of respondents made cost estimates
that were above the seventy-fifth percentile of expert projections. So, a substantial
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share of respondents’ estimates mapped onto the upper end of experts’ predicted
distribution of retiree healthcare costs. As emphasized above, we cannot be
confident that the respondents who estimated higher retiree health costs are the
individuals who will actually incur those costs. Still, the number of respondents
giving relatively high out-of-pocket healthcare cost estimates was greater than we
had anticipated, and even the median estimate for monthly costs was closer than we
had expected to the median expert estimate. Overall, respondents offered sensible
answers with regard to life expectancies and projections of increasing healthcare
costs in the last year of life. Respondents’ estimates about likely insurance coverage
in retirement were not far from actual coverage levels, even if somewhat overly
optimistic with regard to likelihood of future Medicaid or ESI coverage.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are aspects of our findings that raise
concerns. While nearly 40% of the population estimated above expert median
estimates for monthly spending, over half of our respondents’ estimates were below
the twenty-fifth percentile expert benchmarks. By definition, if the expert estimates
are accurate, at least half of those estimating costs below the twenty-fifth percentile
are underestimating future costs. With regard to lump-sum targets, median responses
were a half to a fifth of expert median estimates for men and women, respectively,
suggesting that a very large fraction of our respondents were seriously
underestimating the amount of savings they would need to accumulate in order to
cover healthcare costs in retirement, and a disproportionate number of men (65%)
and women (79%) offered estimates below the median expert benchmark.199
On the other end of the distribution, respondents with the highest lump sum
estimates might—if these outlier estimates are genuine—be engaged in
overestimation that discourages actual savings. What is striking is the unexpected
overestimation—often by substantial amounts—of reported lump sums, as compared
to implied lump sums based on life expectancies and monthly projections. Some
individuals may be radically overestimating their savings needs for retiree heath in a
way that could discourage actual savings out of a sense of futility. This finding
warrants additional work and suggests that there may be potential to show people
that achieving sufficient savings might be more feasible than they imagine.
The degree to which younger cohorts’ expectations are especially deficient in
comparison to older cohorts is less clear but suggests an important area for further
investigation. On some survey responses, younger cohorts did seem to expect higher
costs, as in the case of future Medicare premiums, as experts project. However, in
assessing average monthly costs of retiree healthcare and lump sum estimates of
required savings, younger cohorts reported only slightly greater estimates than older
cohorts. While interpretation of these responses is ambiguous, our results raise the
possibility that younger cohorts are materially underestimating their out-of-pocket
costs for healthcare in retirement. They might be particularly good targets for efforts
to improve financial planning while at a point in the lifecycle—during their working

199

As discussed above, a number of reasons could explain why respondents fell somewhat further beneath
expert benchmarks for their lump sum estimates than they did for monthly cost estimates. In part, the
difference could be a result of respondents somewhat underestimating their likelihood of surviving to age
seventy-five. In addition, respondents may have had difficulty in calculating what is essentially the NPV of
expected healthcare costs, although, as noted above, our implied lump sum analysis suggests that at least
some respondents erred in overestimating the NPV equivalent of their projected monthly costs discounted by
self-reported life expectancies. In addition, some respondents may have misinterpreted our question about
lump sum estimates. Finally, our benchmark studies are based on somewhat different assumptions and do
not perfectly align with each other.
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years—where it may still be possible for some individuals to plan successfully for
future expenditures.
b. Demographic Variation
As discussed above, respondents’ estimates varied appropriately and
significantly according to only some of the factors that experts report are predictive
of future spending. Regression analysis showed our respondents’ estimates were
directionally correct in some regards. For example, our higher income respondents
estimated relatively higher out-of-pocket spending, consistent with expert studies of
spending. In addition, respondents’ expected levels of insurance coverage
corresponded with variations in their estimates of out-of-pocket costs consistent with
what experts report.200
The places where respondents seem least sensitive to the fact that demographic
factors might cause them to have higher baseline spending suggest targeted
opportunities for intervention. The women in our survey showed a dramatically less
acute understanding of future out-of-pocket expenditures than the men in our survey
with regard to lifetime spending estimates. Even similar estimates given by men and
women would be reason for concern in light of the evidence that women spend
significantly more than men on out-of-pocket healthcare over the course of
retirement. Yet women offered lower absolute lifetime spending estimates than men,
suggesting both less knowledge of spending and possible insensitivity to the fact that
women spend more than their male counterparts.
Assuming our data is correct, it is difficult to know why this gender gap exists.
Our women respondents may underestimate for the same reasons that women, even
college-educated women, lag behind men on measures of financial literacy and
numeracy, as evinced repeatedly in studies.201 It is possible that many of these
women have relied on another individual for household financial management.
Regardless of the explanation, women are particularly financially vulnerable in
retirement if they fail to anticipate this source of significant future costs.
This finding confirms the need to close the gender gap that leaves women
behind in matters of mathematics and finances, a problem with roots much deeper
than we can examine here. One more modest option is to focus efforts to improve
financial planning on women, in particular, as examined in Part B.1 below. More
ambitiously, we might reconsider the wisdom of an insurance system that leaves
many women with little income in retirement but, even at the median, subject to
50% more spending than the typical man, even before factoring in long-term care
costs.

200

See supra note 194.
Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008) (explaining that financial
“[i]lliteracy is widespread among the general population and particularly acute among specific
demographic groups, such as women”); Dan Kadlec, Women and Money: Even College Grads Flunk
Personal Finance, TIME (June 28, 2012), available at http://moneyland.time.com/2012/06/28/womenand-money-even-college-grads-flunk-personal-finance/ (describing a new study that reports low
financial literacy scores for women); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and
Retirement Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 10 (Mich. Retirement
Research Ctr., Paper No. WP 2007-157, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095869; see also Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Sophistication in
Older Population 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17863, 2012).
201

56

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. 39 NO. 1 2013

c. Further Research
Our research suggests several important directions for further study. As a
preliminary matter, based on what we learned in our literature review, we note the
need for better collection of data on out-of-pocket healthcare costs and greater
consistency in how these costs are defined and measured as a foundation for any of
the approaches discussed. As healthcare costs continue to increase and politicians
debate reform proposals, policymakers need to have better data on the current
distribution of out-of-pocket cost for retirees and the implications of competing
reform proposals on these costs. The lack of consistent, quality data makes it
difficult to address a healthcare spending problem when there is disagreement on the
definition and magnitude of the problem among the experts in this field.
While policy implications of this work, discussed below, focus on respondents
who underestimate the magnitude of retiree healthcare costs and the risks associated
with those costs, further study into the respondents with estimates of retiree
healthcare costs above experts’ median projections would also be valuable. While
our survey design did not offer insight into how these respondents came up with
their estimates, there are a number of reasons why a substantial portion of the
population might have a “ballpark sense” of retiree out-of-pocket healthcare costs.
At least in the case of monthly cost estimates, our respondents may merely offer a
small, non-zero guess of a couple of hundred dollars in response to a question that
implied the existence of some costs. Alternatively, as healthcare costs and premiums
are pervasive throughout life, respondents could possibly be inferring retirement
costs from their own prior and current experience. Or they might also have
familiarity with parents’ or acquaintances’ experiences with Medicare and other
forms of supplemental retiree coverage. Or, consistent with our finding that
consultations with financial planners are positively correlated with cost estimates,
some respondents may have benefitted from financial education. Understanding the
thought processes of individuals who came up with cost estimates within the range
of expert predictions would inform how to reproduce similar results with others.
Another important question to explore is the extent to which higher estimates of
retiree healthcare costs are associated with higher levels of dedicated savings for
these costs or other forms of financial planning that make these individuals better
prepared to finance these expenditures in retirement. In other words, does specific
knowledge of retiree healthcare costs make individuals better prepared to bear those
costs? Similarly, it would be valuable to ascertain whether severe overestimation of
retiree health costs dampens retirement savings on the grounds, suggested above,
that overly high estimates provoke savings futility. In short, further study of the
relationship between estimates of retiree healthcare costs and actual financial
planning behavior would provide a crucial link for future reforms.
2. Point Two: Uncertainty and Risk
Our findings, while tentative here, suggest that people struggle to gauge the
variability in spending they might face due to three key drivers of future spending
uncertainty: (1) variation in individual health experience among retirees; (2)
unanticipated medical cost growth; and (3) changes in government policies with
respect to Medicare and other government programs that could increase out-ofpocket costs for some or all retirees. In other words, respondents did not understand
the potential that they might face debilitating and unpredictable future spending.
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Most—but not all—of our respondents identified all of these sources of
uncertainty as causing concern, but they failed to effectively distinguish between the
magnitude of each. In particular, it seems that our respondents underestimated the
risk posed by relatively high individual health expenditures. While this risk is
arguably the greatest of the three risks for anyone now nearing or in retirement, our
respondents did not unambiguously identify it as greater than the others and
underestimated the magnitude of variability in spending they might face if they were
in the upper end of the spending distribution. They arguably also underestimated the
magnitude of potential spending variability due to policy change, especially at a
moment in time when Medicare is vulnerable to fundamental changes.
Failure to appropriately account for spending uncertainty would mean that even
those retirees with responses similar to experts’ median estimates might be
unprepared to finance future costs if any of the above risks came to fruition.
Furthermore, when making insurance selections and purchases, they might not
accurately consider the risks against which they need to protect. For example, a
retiree aware of and in a position to finance median out-of-pocket spending for
someone like herself could nonetheless face financial crisis if she experiences a
serious health problem or develops a chronic condition that propels her into the
ninetieth percentile of spenders, leading to costs double what she planned to finance.
Failure to comprehend the potential implications of policy reforms, such as major
changes in Medicare and Medicaid programs, could also inhibit informed
engagement in political debates on entitlement reform.
The difficulty that consumers face in comprehending and managing risk is a
recurring theme in academic studies on cognitive processing and retirement
planning, with work on the annuity puzzle being perhaps the most familiar
example.202 In light of this work, our findings on the inability of respondents to
understand the potential levels of variability of future spending are hardly surprising.
Retiree healthcare costs are, in essence, a negative annuity that depends on a host of
imponderables including life expectancies, individual healthcare experience, policy
changes, and changes in healthcare costs. It is surprising enough that many
respondents were able to make plausible ballpark estimates of typical costs; it would
have strained credulity had they also apprehended risks and uncertainty correctly.
Still, these cognitive limitations have important implications for insurance design,
regulation, and policy, as discussed below.
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our findings suggest two distinct problems that could hamper retirees’ ability to
finance out-of-pocket healthcare spending. Point One above addresses ways in
which retirees fail to anticipate likely future expenditures, even for a typical retiree.
The design of our current system for financing retiree healthcare costs implicitly
assumes that most retirees will plan to finance these costs. Places where we observe
underestimation suggest opportunities to improve knowledge of and/or financial
planning for retiree healthcare expenditures, as discussed in the first section below.
202
For an overview of cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL S TUD. 199, 203-25 (2006). See also Howell E.
Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in BEHAVIORAL P UBLIC FINANCE 261, 271-75
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). For an overview of the annuitization puzzle with a
helpful review of the literature, see Jeffrey Brown, Understanding the Role of Annuities in Retirement
Planning, in OVERCOMING THE SAVINGS S LUMP: HOW TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS P ROGRAMS 178-206 (Annamaria Lusardi ed., 2008).
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Point Two discusses our finding of a widespread misapprehension of level of
spending variability—a problem that may be best addressed with an insurance
response, as discussed in the last section below.
1. Improving Financial Planning: Opportunities and Challenges
While our findings suggest that the overall financial literacy gap with regard to
out-of-pocket costs may be smaller than we anticipated for at least some portion of
the population, our results suggest some areas in which well-targeted efforts might
help people better understand and plan for healthcare spending in retirement.
For example, targeting efforts at women may be productive in light of the fact
that women live longer than men and will need to manage out-of-pocket spending
for more years and, for those who outlive a spouse or partner, on their own.
Likewise, efforts focused on younger working-age individuals might also be
valuable during a time when they are in the best a position to save more. Especially
if interest rates remain low and healthcare costs continue to outpace GDP growth,
they may need to save considerably more than anticipated.
Our findings do not point toward any one particular approach to improve
planning. A healthy debate exists in the literature over whether education or
approaches that more directly shape behavior, based on defaults or incentives, are
more welfare-promoting. One way to address a knowledge deficiency would be
through financial education to bring individual expectations more in line with expert
estimations. Especially to the degree people might be focused on accumulating
sufficient savings for future healthcare needs,203 priming them to consider the
magnitude of this particular category of future costs could be an effective way to
motivate more saving.204 Supporters of financial education approaches argue that
such an approach allows people to make decisions based on individual preferences,
rather than presuming one-size-fits-all solutions (as savings defaults might do).205
For educational efforts to be effective, consumers must be capable of understanding
the information provided and able and willing to respond to it.206
Results of financial education programs undertaken by employers and the
government have been mixed,207 and there is healthy skepticism among some
scholars of their value.208 More information alone, for example, might not lead to
greater understanding. The anchoring in our treatments, designed to simulate
financial education, had surprisingly little effect on total monthly costs or lump sum
203

De Nardi et al., supra note 11, at 72-73 (describing the strong effect of future healthcare
spending needs on savings).
204
Of course, individuals do not need to be primed to save an amount sufficient to cover total
retiree healthcare costs. See generally Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Changing Impact of Social
Security on Retirements Income in the United States, SOC. SEC. B ULLETIN, no. 3, 2003/2004, available
at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n3/v65n3p1.pdf. As a result of social security, most
American have some amount of annuity income in retirement and a portion of that income could be
used to support monthly costs. Id. Thus, sensible financial planning for retiree healthcare costs might
consist of a combination of precautionary savings and budgeted monthly costs.
205
Amir & Lobel, supra note at 19, at 20 (“P]erhaps more than with some policy fields . . . health
policy cannot be simply about directing healthy behavior but must aim for an understanding of how
individuals reason and decide.”).
206
See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in
Insurance Consumer Protection 9, 18-19 (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-35,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130908.
207
Lusardi, supra note 15, at 20-23 (describing the mostly ineffective results of financial
education programs).
208
See Schwarcz, supra note 208, at 18-19.
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estimates, which suggests that education would have to consist of more than simple
reporting of typical costs. Furthermore, if the healthcare financial literacy gap we are
observing is part of a larger innumeracy problem, especially for women, efforts to
improve planning will require improving numeracy so that women have both the
information and the tools to make good decisions.
To the extent it might be difficult or inefficient to improve financial security
through education or among boundedly-rational consumers, more deliberate
interventions might be more effective. For example, the use of choice architecture
approaches could prompt increased savings. Such approaches have been shown to
bolster overall retirement savings.209 Alternatively, recent financial literacy work has
suggested the effectiveness of an intermediate approach, using planning aids that
guide people through financial decisions at critical decision moments, instead of
using either generalized education seminars or strong defaults.210 Further research
would have to investigate which of these types of efforts could in fact increase
savings for healthcare out-of-pocket spending without cannibalizing other retirement
savings or necessary current consumption.
These approaches presume that at least some portion of the population that
underestimates future spending needs could better plan for these costs if desired. A
major limitation of any of these approaches is the degree to which those
underestimating expenditures are unable to save more or much more than they
currently do without undesirable tradeoffs, which is likely true for at least part of our
respondent population. As noted above, we saw a correlation between lower
estimates and lower income levels, and at least one study suggests that healthcare
savings incentives have limited effect for some of the population because of income
constraints.211 Despite such limitations, if targeted efforts to improve financial
planning for out-of-pocket healthcare spending have some positive effect,212 they
could reduce unanticipated financial insecurity, especially for particularly vulnerable
subgroup populations, while also limiting avoidable reliance on healthcare safety
nets, including Medicaid.
2. Improving Risk Protection: Implications for Insurance Design and Policy Reforms
Addressing respondents’ deficiencies in understanding spending uncertainty is
more complex. Studies have repeatedly shown that individuals systematically
misperceive risk213 and suggest that risk-education efforts can be an uphill battle.214
209

See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Lusardi, supra note 15, at 23-26
(discussing studies showing the effectiveness of default programs for savings, including the lauded
Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) program devised by Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi that
increases default savings rates as employees’ income increases).
210
See Lusardi, supra note 15, at 26-20 (discussing efforts to simplify decisions to save, without
using strong defaults).
211
FISHMAN, supra note 5, at ix (reporting the effects incentives programs have on savings for
low-income populations).
212
Id.
213
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 72 (describing cognitive biases that might produce
undesirable results even in the face of perfect knowledge); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1084-85 (2000) (discussing studies showing individual biases in decision-making in the face of
uncertainty).
214
See Michael Bond, Risk School, 461 NATURE 1189, 1191 (2009) (describing debate over
whether people can be taught to understand risk and make well-informed decisions based on it or
whether it is more appropriate for regulators to guide consumers to better risk decisions through a
“nudge approach”). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,
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Furthermore, for many low- to middle-income Americans, knowledge that they
might face future healthcare expenditures two or three times higher than median
expenditures will do little to help them save for expenditures at these levels or to
obtain sufficient insurance protection, especially in the current insurance
marketplace. We briefly describe two possible approaches to improve risk protection
in light of misperceptions of uncertainty.
a. Low Risk Insurance Policies: Promoting Transparency and Uptake
To the extent that insurance options that protect against catastrophic spending
are available and affordable, there may be opportunities to help consumers better
identify and choose supplemental insurance that offers more protection against
spending variability.215 A first step would be to increase enrollment among the twothirds of the eligible population not enrolled in the Medicare Savings Programs and
Low-Income Subsidy program for prescription drugs, discussed above, which limit
Medicare premiums and cost-sharing for lower-income individuals.216
For others, one starting point might be requiring greater transparency with
regard to spending variability in insurance options. Individuals must choose among
Medicare options and supplemental insurance programs without meaningful
guidance on how different options mitigate the risk of debilitating healthcare
expenditures in retirement. The menu of choices is overwhelming for even a savvy
consumer.
Regulatory reforms could make this choice easier. Insurance regulation requires
disclosure of certain information, such as deductibles, co-pays, and annual and
lifetime limits, but does not make transparent residual out-of-pocket payment risks
that fall to policy holders at different levels of healthcare utilization.217 This means
that even astute, risk-averse individuals are unable to identify the lowest-risk
policies. What consumers would need to understand to manage spending risk is the
range of possible individual costs under various supplemental insurance options. For
example, supplemental Medigap policies could provide a graph that illustrates the
total out-of-pocket spending distribution (premiums plus direct costs) among all
enrollees in a particular plan. The buyer could compare potential spending if he is at
the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth percentile of enrollees in one
plan against his exposure at the same levels of spending in another. Regulators could
require the collection of this data and require that insurers disclose it in ways that
97 NW. U. L. REV . 1165, 1206-19 (2003) (describing how understanding the heuristics that people use
in decision-making can be the basis for policies to help them make better decisions).
215
See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Risk Management for the Future: Age, Risk and Choice
Architecture
19-23
(July
9,
2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102541 (discussing use of choice architecture to
help especially older people make more future-oriented, less risky choices).
216
See Dorn & Shang, supra note 38 (discusses strategies for increasing MSP enrollment).
217
PPACA attempts to address this shortcoming for working-age populations by requiring
reporting on the actuarial value of policies that will be sold in the new health exchanges; despite good
intentions, actuarial value may be too complicated a measure for most consumers to translate into
likely personal spending. See RYAN LORE ET AL ., COMMONWEALTH F UND , CHOOSING THE “BEST ”
PLAN IN A HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE: ACTUARIAL VALUE TELLS ONLY P ART OF THE S TORY 6
(2012), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/
2012/Aug/1626_Lore_choosing_best_plan_HIE_actuarial_ib_v2.pdf. Also pursuant to PPACA, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) developed a new form for summaries of
coverage. See NAIC, SAMPLE COMPLETED S UMMARY OF C OVERAGE (2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_consumer_information_hhs_dol_submission_1107_soc
_populated.pdf.
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consumers can reasonably understand. If consumers understood and used this data as
an important criterion when buying a policy, insurers might offer more policies that
limit exposure to levels consumers prefer.
On the other hand, as noted above, work in psychology and behavioral law and
economics suggests that risk is a concept that is generally not understood, and
decisions with regard to uncertain future events are particularly prone to cognitive
error.218 Greater transparency may not increase uptake of lower-risk policies if
consumers struggle to grasp and systematically underestimate the risk they face
individually. To promote greater financial security in an uncertain and cognitively
complex environment, regulatory approaches could guide consumers to adopt
supplemental policies with more catastrophic risk protection. Medicare has recently
begun to steer retirees toward higher-rated Medigap policies;219 one could imagine
using risk protection as a criterion for such steering.
b. Medicare Policy Reforms
Alternately, Medicare and supplemental insurance could be redesigned to
simplify choices and to reduce spending risk across the board, rather than to trying
shape insurance choices among problematic options. Such an approach would be
especially attractive to the extent policymakers agree better risk protection would be
universally beneficial. The EBRI benchmark study projects a 2020 retiree with
wraparound Medicare (including supplemental Plan F “catastrophic” coverage) will
spend over $300,000 over retirement if at the ninetieth percentile of spending.
Getting to these high levels likely requires a combination of many sources of high
out-of-pocket spending, including Part B, D, and Medigap premiums and significant
spending on prescription drugs and services not covered by insurance. Few
Americans, even if armed with perfect information and comprehension of that
information, could manage such levels of out-of-pocket spending.
Regulators could redesign basic Medicare or Medigap policies to simplify
coverage and reduce exposure to high out-of-pocket costs for those with intensive
medical needs. For example, one proposal for “Medicare Extra” offers a simpler way
to fill Medicare’s gaps with a single “Medicare E” policy; the authors’ analysis
suggests their proposed approach would limit exposure with no increase to
governmental or individual out-of-pocket spending.220 Policies might also trade off a
degree of first-dollar coverage for more catastrophic protection. Regulators would
need to tread carefully in this space to avoid the fate of an earlier policy attempt to
limit catastrophic exposure, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, which was
repealed shortly after passage,221 and to design policies in a way that is neither
regressive nor detrimental to retirees’ health.222 PPACA directs increased cost218
See THALER & S UNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 72 (describing cognitive biases that might produce
undesirable results even in the face of perfect knowledge); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 215, at 109192 (describing overconfidence biases).
219
Marsha Gold, An Illustrative Analysis of Medicare Options Compare: What’s There and
What’s Not?, 27 INSIGHT ON ISSUES, April 2009, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
health/i27_options.pdf.
220
See Karen Davis et al., In the Literature: Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option
for Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/
2005/11/15/hlthaff.w5.442.short.
221
See generally Thomas Rice et al., The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act: A Post-Mortem, 9
HEALTH AFF. 75 (1990) (describing factors that explain the repeal of this Act that attempted to limit the
catastrophic costs a retiree might face by imposing additional taxes on higher-income elderly).
222
A study of several Medigap reform proposals that attempt to control the growth in Medicare
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sharing in Medigap plans to reduce usage of Medicare Part B physician services, 223
which could offer a window of opportunity to simultaneously strengthen
catastrophic protection without increasing premiums. In addition, as part of Medigap
reform, the Simpson-Bowles commission, the Obama Administration, and others
have proposed simplifying Medicare cost sharing.224 These proposals would all make
it easier for beneficiaries to navigate Medicare and supplemental coverage options in
ways that promote their future financial security.
At the very least, in an environment where we expect individuals to manage
complex financial planning, policymakers should strive to make it easier—not
harder—for them to make successful choices. Changes to Medicare and Medicaid
policy may be necessary in the coming years to stem the increasing share of
governmental spending on healthcare. Controlling public expenditures on retiree
healthcare costs is a critical component to restoring balance to federal fiscal policies.
Many reform proposals contemplate shifting a portion of these costs back to retirees,
either through reducing the generosity of Medicare payments or scaling back the
scope of Medicaid support for the elderly. While these proposals are often discussed
in terms of aggregate deficit reduction or the cost-shifting to typical retirees,
attention must also be given to the implications of these reforms on the risks
imposed on individual retirees, especially on those with high individual medical
costs. Beyond scoring the aggregate financial effects of reforms, policy analysts
should also take into account the distributional consequences of reform. At a
minimum, public debate over entitlement reform should be informed through clear
understanding of the distributional consequences of competing reform proposals on
a population that may struggle to understand how such reforms could affect their
future financial security.

spending by increasing cost-sharing, with varying limits on total out-of-pocket costs, showed cost reduction
for most enrollees but cost increases for about 21%, disproportionately affecting those in fair/poor health
and lower-income enrollees. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDIGAP REFORMS: POTENTIAL EFFECTS
OF BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICARE SPENDING AND BENEFICIARY COSTS v (2011).
223
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3210, 124
Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
224
LINEHAN, supra note 55, at 11 (describing proposals from the Simpson-Bowles commission,
the Congressional Budget Office, and the Obama Administration); see also Amanda Cassidy, Health
Policy Brief: Putting Limits on ‘Medigap,’ HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.healthaffairs
.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=52.
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The survey instrument had eight sections and three different treatments. Not all
treatments contained questions from all eight sections or included all available
questions within each section. All participants received the same introductory
questions within Section 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
basic treatments. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned one of the two
sets of questions in Section 8. Below is the survey language of Section 1, followed
by the language used for each treatment from Sections 2-7, and then the language of
Section 8. Italicized words are explanatory but were not included in the actual
survey text. Language within brackets refers to conditional questions.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS
Introduction
In this survey, we will be asking about health care costs in retirement. But first
we want to start with a few questions about your own health and financial planning.
Question 1
First, how would you characterize your health now?
Answers:
1-Excellent
2-Very Good
3-Good
4-Fair
5-Poor
Question 2
Are you familiar with government programs and other insurance plans that
might cover your health care expenses in retirement (with 10 being extremely
familiar and 1 being not very familiar)?
Answers: scale from 1-10
Question 3
How much attention do you give to monthly health care costs and other
expenses (with 10 being a lot of attention and 1 being not very much attention)?
Answers: scale from 1-10
Question 4
Have you ever consulted a financial planner about your retirement?
Answers:
1-Yes
2-No
3-Don’t Know/Can’t Remember
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TREATMENT A
SECTION 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE
Introduction
In this survey, we want to find out how much you expect to pay for health care
in retirement. We are interested in your out-of-pocket costs. Out-of-pocket costs are
any expenses that you pay yourself. In addition to any direct payments, these costs
include insurance premiums for government programs and other health insurance
plans. Out-of-pocket costs also cover deductibles and co-pays. Out-of-pocket costs
do not include payments made on your behalf or reimbursed by government
programs or other insurance plans. In all cases, we are asking about your own
personal health care costs in retirement. Do not include health care costs of other
members of your household. Unless otherwise indicated, please do not include in
your estimates the cost of long-term residential health-care services (such as
extended stays in nursing homes) or premiums for long-term health care insurance.
Some questions ask for estimates about costs in the future. Please do not attempt to
adjust your estimates to reflect price increases from overall inflation. Just make your
estimates using the value of money today.
SECTION 3: LIFE EXPECTANCY
Introduction
Planning for retirement is hard because we do not know how long we will live.
We would now like to get a better sense of how you think about your own life
expectancy. We would like to know how likely you think it is that you will live
beyond certain ages. If you are very confident you will live beyond a certain age,
you should click on the right side of the ruler, towards the upper end of the range. If
you are less confident you will live beyond the age, you should click on the left side
of the ruler and the lower end of the range.
Question 1 [asked if age < 65]
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 65?
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100
Question 2 [asked if age < 75]
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 75?
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100
Question 3 [asked if age < 85]
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 85?
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100
Question 4 [asked if age < 95]
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 95?
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100
Question 5 [asked if age < 105]
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 105?
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100
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SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS
Introduction
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-ofpocket costs in retirement. Your estimates should include all premiums for any
government programs or health care insurance plans. You should also include other
out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses that you pay directly. Recognizing that
these expenses may vary from month to month, please estimate your average
monthly expenses.
Question 1
What do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average?
Please give your response in terms of dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number
Question 2
It may be hard to think about this, but during the final year of your life, what do
you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average? Please give
your response in terms of dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number
SECTION 6: LUMP SUM ESTIMATES
Question 1
In planning for retirement, some individuals like to think in terms of how much
money they would need to save by the time they turn 65 in order to have enough
money to cover out-of-pocket costs in retirement. Imagine that you were asked to
give advice to someone with similar preferences and health characteristics as your
own. If such a person wanted to have enough money to cover a reasonable estimate
of their total out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement, how much do you
think they would need to have set aside? Please give your answer in terms of the
total amount of dollars needed at age 65.
Answer choices: any number
[If the answer given was less than $1,000, the survey displayed the following
prompt:
Are you sure savings of only ____ at 65 would be enough to cover out-of-pocket
costs in retirement? Please go back and check your answer.]
SECTION 7: LONG-TERM CARE
Introduction
The following questions concern the costs of long-term residential health care
services, such as nursing home care or an assisted living facility. Long-term
residential health care services include extended stays in nursing homes or assisted
living facilities and also extended assistance with activities of daily living (eating,
dressing or bathing) at home by home health aides.
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Question 1
If you were to maintain a separate insurance policy for long-term residential
health care services in retirement, how much do you think the policy would cost for
someone like you? Please give your estimate in terms of dollars for a monthly
premium.
Answer choices: any number
Question 2
If you were not to maintain a separate insurance policy for long-term residential
health care services, how much would you expect your out-of-pocket costs to be for
a month of residential nursing home care?
Answer choices: any number
SECTION 8A: RISK FACTORS – INSURANCE
Introduction
In this final set of questions, we ask you to consider several factors that might
increase your out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement and to consider how
much you would be willing to pay each month in order to eliminate these risks.
Question 1
Research suggests that health care expenses in retirement can vary considerably
from individual to individual based on differences in the health of individuals and
their medical needs. As a result, out-of-pocket costs for some individuals can be
much higher than those of the average retiree. How much would you be willing to
pay each month for an insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring outof-pocket costs higher than those of the average retiree, regardless of your own
health or medical needs?
Question 2
In recent years, health care costs have increased faster than the overall rate of
inflation, and some have expressed concern that health care costs may continue to
increase faster than overall inflation. How much would you be willing to pay each
month for an insurance policy that fully protected you against any unexpected
acceleration in the rate of inflation of health care costs?
Question 3
In recent years, policy analysts have been discussing whether changes in
Medicare and other government programs will be necessary to address the problems
of federal government deficits. Some have expressed concern that such changes
could reduce government support for retiree health care and increase the amount that
retirees must themselves pay for health care costs. How much would you be willing
to pay each month for an insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring
additional out-of-pocket costs as a result of any changes in Medicare or other
government programs?
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SECTION 8B: RISK FACTORS – QUALITATIVE
Introduction
In this final set of questions, we ask you to consider various factors that might
increase your out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement.
Question 1
Research suggests that health care expenses in retirement can vary from
individual to individual based on differences in the health of individuals and their
medical needs. How concerned are you that your own out-of-pocket costs might be
higher than average based on your own health and medical needs?
Answer choices:
1-Not concerned at all
2-A little concerned
3-Quite concerned
4-Extremely concerned
Question 2
If your personal health care expenses in retirement do end up being higher than
average as a result of your own health and medical needs, how much more do you
think would you need to budget to be highly confident that you would have enough
to cover your out-of-pocket costs?
Answer choices:
1-A little more (less than 5 percent)
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent)
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent)
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent)
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent)
Question 3
In recent years, the price of health care has increased faster than the overall rate
of inflation, and some have expressed concern that the price of health care may
continue to increase faster than overall inflation. How concerned are you that faster
rates of inflation for the price of health care will increase your out-of-pocket costs in
retirement?
Answer choices:
1-Not concerned at all
2-A little concerned
3-Quite concerned
4-Extremely concerned
Question 4
In the event that the price of health care does rise faster than overall inflation,
how much more do you think you would need to budget to be highly confident that
you would have enough to cover your out-of-pocket costs in retirement?
Answer choices:
1-A little more (less than 5 percent)
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent)
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent)
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent)
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent)
Question 5
In recent years, policy analysts have been discussing whether changes in
Medicare and other government programs will be necessary to address the problems
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of federal government deficits. Some have expressed concern that such changes
could reduce government support for retiree health care and increase the amount that
retirees must themselves pay for health care costs. How concerned are you that such
changes might increase your out-of-pocket costs in retirement?
Answer choices:
1-Not concerned at all
2-A little concerned
3-Quite concerned
4-Extremely concerned
Question 6
If government support for retiree health care is reduced in coming years, how
much more do you think you would need to budget to be highly confident that you
would have enough to cover your out-of-pocket costs in retirement?
Answer choices:
1-A little more (less than 5 percent)
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent)
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent)
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent)
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent)
TREATMENT B [Same as Treatment A, but with these Additional Questions]
SECTION 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE
Question 1
Do you expect to be covered by Medicare in retirement?
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100
[If the answer chosen was greater than zero, the survey displayed the following
questions]:
As you may know, Medicare offers two forms of basic health care coverage for
most Americans over the age of 65: Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage.
In addition, several years ago a new Medicare Part D Prescription Drug coverage
became available. If you were to maintain Medicare coverage in retirement, which
form of basic health care coverage would you expect to elect:
Answer choices:
1-Traditional Medicare Coverage
2-Medicare Advantage Coverage
3-Don’t Know or Haven’t Decided
Would you expect to add Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Coverage?
Answer choices:
1-Yes
2-No
3-Don’t Know or Haven’t Decided
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Question 2
Beyond Medicare, do you expect to be covered by an Employer Sponsored
Retiree Health Care Policy in retirement?
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100
Question 3
Beyond Medicare, do you expect to be covered by a Medigap Supplement
Insurance Policy in retirement other than one sponsored by a former employer?
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100
Question 4
Do you expect to be covered by Medicaid in retirement?
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100
Question 5
Do you expect to be covered by Veterans Administration health care benefits in
retirement?
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100
SECTION 4: MONTHLY PREMIUM COST EXPECTATIONS
Question 1
As you may know, Medicare beneficiaries are required to pay monthly
premiums for various kinds of coverage. If you were to maintain Medicare coverage,
how much would you expect your total monthly Medicare premiums to be during
your retirement years? Please give your response in terms of dollars per month.
(please round up to the nearest dollar)
Answer choices: any number
Question 2 [asked if likelihood of having Employer Sponsored Retiree Health
Care coverage > 0]
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Employer
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement. As you may know, some
Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage requires participants to pay
monthly premiums. If you do maintain Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care
coverage in retirement, how much do you expect your monthly premiums to be for
this coverage? Please give your response in terms of dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number
Question 3 [asked if likelihood of having Medigap coverage > 0]
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Medigap
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement. If you do maintain Medigap
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement, how much do you expect your
monthly premiums to be for this coverage? Please give your response in terms of
dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number
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SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS
Introduction
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-ofpocket costs for health care expenses at various times in retirement. Your estimates
should include all premiums for any government programs or health care insurance
plans. You should also include other out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses
that you pay directly. Recognizing that these expenses may vary from month to
month, please estimate your average monthly expenses.
Question 1 [asked if age < 65]
When you are 65, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars
per month.
Answer choices: any number
[If respondent was 65 years old or older, the survey displayed the following
question instead:
Since you turned 65, what would you estimate your total monthly out-of-pocket
costs for health care expenses have been on average? Please give your response in
terms of dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number]
Question 2 [asked if age < 75]
When you are 75, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars
per month.
Answer choices: any number
Question 3 [asked if age < 85]
When you are 85, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars
per month.
Answer choices: any number
Question 4
It may be hard to think about this, but during the final year of your life, what do
you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average? Please give
your response in terms of dollars per month.
Answer choices: any number
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TREATMENT C [Same as Treatment B, but with Revised Anchoring
Information]
SECTION 3: LIFE EXPECTANCY
Introduction
Planning for retirement is hard because we do not know how long we will live.
According to experts, American men who turn 65 today are projected to live a bit
over 17 more years on average and women turning 65 are projected to live another
20 years on average. We would now like to get a better sense of how you think about
your own life expectancy. We would like to know how likely you think it is that you
will live beyond certain ages. If you are very confident you will live beyond a
certain age, you should click on the right side of the ruler towards the upper end of
the range. If you are less confident you will live beyond the age, you should click on
the left side of the ruler and the lower end of the range.
SECTION 4: MONTHLY PREMIUM COST EXPECTATIONS
Question 1
As you may know, Medicare beneficiaries are required to pay monthly
premiums for their coverage. Currently, monthly premiums for traditional Medicare
coverage range from $95 to $115 a month depending on the year individuals started
receiving coverage. Individuals with annual incomes over $85,000 and families with
incomes over $170,000 pay higher monthly premiums for traditional Medicare
coverage, with premiums ranging from $160 to $370 a month. Medicare Part D
Prescription Drug coverage is additional and Part D premiums average about $40 a
month. For those participating in Medicare Advantage coverage, which usually
includes its own prescription drug benefits, monthly premiums range are about the
same as those for participants in traditional Medicare and Part D Prescription Drug
programs. Medicare Advantage participants do, however, sometimes receive a
premium rebate, which in recent years has averaged $20 a month, and also generally
pay lower out-of-pocket expenses than participants in traditional Medicare. If you
were to maintain Medicare coverage, how much do you expect your total monthly
Medicare premiums to be during your retirement years? Please give your response in
terms of dollars per month.
Question 2 [asked if likelihood of having Employer Sponsored Retiree Health
Care coverage > 0]
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Employer
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement. As you may know, some
Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage requires participants to pay
monthly premiums. The average monthly premium cost for Employer Sponsored
Retiree Health Care coverage is about $165 a month for a retiree aged 65 or older
and $330 a month for a retiree younger than age 65. If you do maintain Employer
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement, how much do you expect
your monthly premiums to be for this coverage? Please give your response in terms
of dollars per month.
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Question 3 [asked if likelihood of having Medigap coverage > 0]
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Medigap
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement. As you may know, pricing for
Medigap Supplemental Insurance premiums vary considerably by state and by terms
of coverage, with monthly premiums ranging from less than $50 to over $200, with
some forms of coverage reaching monthly premiums of $500 or more. If you do
maintain Medigap Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement, how much do you
expect your monthly premiums to be for this coverage?
SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS
Introduction
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-ofpocket costs at various times in retirement. Your estimates should include all
premiums for any government programs or health care insurance plans. You should
also include other out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses that you pay directly.
As a rule of thumb, insurance premiums typically constitute between forty and sixty
percent of total out-of-pocket costs. As you may know, the cost of health care has
risen faster than overall inflation over the past few decades, and government experts
predict that retiree health care costs will rise more than one percentage point faster
than overall inflation in coming years. If that prediction is accurate, the real costs of
retiree health care would increase by more than ten percent every decade.
Recognizing that these expenses may vary from month to month, please estimate
your average monthly expenses for health care at various times during your
retirement years.

